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The most ballyhooed achievement of the bioethics movement has
been the triumph of patient autonomy over medical paternalism.'
Largely through the development of the cause of action for lack of
informed consent 2, but also through developments in the areas of
reproductive rights3 and death and dying 4, the law has appeared to
t Robert A. Lucas Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-
Bloomington. Early versions of some of the ideas in this article were discussed
during the inaugural lecture for the Robert A. Lucas Chair. I am grateful to members
of the audience for their helpful and provocative questions and, of course, to the
Lucas family for their generosity. Many thanks to the law schools of the University
of Michigan, the University of Washington, and Seattle University, which at various
times have graciously shared their office and library facilities with me. I am also
grateful for the helpful research assistance of Thea Langsam and Megan Hill.
See, e.g., Alan Meisel, Managed Care, Autonomy, and Decisionmaking at
the End of Life, 35 Hous. L. REV. 1393, 1397-99 (1999) (focusing on the rise of
citizen autonomy, especially in health care, in the twentieth century). For a
persuasive critique of the triumph of autonomy, see also CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE
PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY: PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND MEDICAL DECISIONS (1998)
(generally describing the influence of the autonomy movement and persuasively
critiquing its triumph).
2 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 502
P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1972). See also Meisel, supra note I, at 1399-1400 (including using
the phrase "informed consent" in judicial opinions). See generally Susan M. Wolf,
Toward a Systemic Theory of lnformed Consent in Managed Care, 35 Hous. L. REV.
1631, 1641 (1999) (discussing the impact bioethics had on the doctrine of informed
consent).
3 E.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-47, 851-52 (1992)
(plurality opinion); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 538
(1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that the Constitution and case law both
forbid states from passing laws that inhibit a woman's reproductive rights); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4 E.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370
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institutionalize the ethical preference for patient-directed decision
making. Meanwhile, medical professionals have become so
habituated to the asserted dominance of patient autonomy that in some
fields of medicine, notably genetic counseling, they even refuse to
offer patients advice or to answer the obvious question, "Doctor, what
would you do?" 5
The ascendancy of patient autonomy has fit oddly with the doctor-
patient relationship. On the one hand, the doctor-patient relationship
imposes on physicians an exclusive obligation to the patient6, which
fits well with autonomy's focus on patient control. On the other hand,
the relationship is said to be fiduciary in nature', which creates a
N.E.2d 417, 426 (Mass. 1977) (construing privacy as encompassing free choice); In
re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976); SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, REFUSAL OF
TREATMENT: A STATE BY STATE COMPILATION OF ENACTED AND MODEL STATUTES
(1991).
5 For an excellent short description of the ethic of nondirectiveness and its
hold on the genetic counseling profession, see Sonia M. Suter, "Sex Selection,
Nondirectiveness, and Equality," 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 473, 478-80 (1996);
Roger B. Dworkin, The Human Genome Project's Implications for Autonomy,
Respect, and Professionalism in Medical Genetics, 7 JAHRBUCH FUR RECHT UND
ETHIK [ANN. REV. LAW & ETHICS], 1999, 115, 116-17, 117 n.9 [hereinafter The
Human Genome Project). See also Charles L. BOSK, ALL GOD'S MISTAKES: GENETIC
COUNSELING IN A PEDIATRIC HOSPITAL (1992). For discussion and criticism of
nondirective genetic counseling see DAVID H. SMITH ET AL., EARLY WARNING: CASES
AND ETHICAL GUIDANCE FOR PRESYMPTOMATIC TESTING IN GENETIC DISEASES 12, 25,
134-36 (1998).
6 John Petrila, Ethics, Money, and the Problem of Coercion in Managed
Behavioral Health Care, 40 ST. Louis U.L.J. 359, 377 (1996); Marc A. Rodwin,
Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties and Obligations in a
Changing Health Care System, 21 AM. L.J. & MED. 241, 247 (1995).
Many commentators have noted the fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient
relationship. E.g., Maxwell J. Mehlman, The Patient-Physician Relationship in an
Era of Scarce Resources: Is There a Duty to Treat?, 25 CONN. L. REV. 349, 367
(1993) (noting that most courts and commentators agree that the patient-physician
relationship is a fiduciary one); David Orentlicher, Health Care Reform and the
Patient-Physician Relationship, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 141, 147 (1995); Petrila, supra
note 6, at 359-61, 390-91; Rodwin, supra note 6, at 246-47; Grant H. Morris, Dissing
Disclosure: Just What the Doctor Ordered, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 313, 314 n.7 (2002);
Alycia C. Regan, Note, Regulating the Business of Medicine: Models.for Integrating
Ethics in Managed Care, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 635, 652 (1997) (discussing
the fiduciary relationship between physicians and their patients).
In addition, as I have noted elsewhere, courts regularly reaffirm the fiduciary nature
of the doctor-patient relationship. E.g., Wohlgemuth v. Meyer, 293 P.2d 816, 820
(Cal. Ct. App. 1956) (stating the doctor-patient relationship is a fiduciary
relationship); Schafer v. Lehrer 476 So.2d 781, 783 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(holding the fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient relationship extends the doctor's
duty beyond mere nonconcealment of medical facts); Yates v. EI-Deiry, 513 N.E.2d
519, 522 (II1. App. Ct. 1987) (asserting that physicians' unique role in society requires
a fiduciary relationship to protect public policy interests in doctor-patient relations);
[Vol. 13:235
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tension when the fiduciary yields control over the beneficiary's well-
being in order to foster the beneficiary's autonomy. After all, the
reason that persons are assigned fiduciary obligations is that their
beneficiaries are thought to need special protections that the fiduciary
is well situated to provide.
Patient autonomy and the exclusive and fiduciary doctor-patient
relationship are supposed to represent the triumph of individualism in
medicine. Evaluation then requires both an assessment of whether
they actually promote and protect individualism and the extent to
which individualism is the most appropriate value to foster. If other
values are sometimes more important (as I shall suggest they are), or
if individualism is not truly being served by the current regime (as I
shall suggest it is not), then a rethinking is in order. The challenge
will be to devise a system that does a better job than the present one of
protecting individualism when individualism ought to dominate, while
protecting other important values as well. What we need is a system
that allows each person to receive as much benefit as possible from
health care providers' expertise while assuring that professionals do
not impose their power in areas beyond their expertise. This article
will address that challenge, and make some tentative suggestions
about designing that system. It will suggest that we reject the
dominance of patient autonomy, abandon the exclusive, fiduciary
nature of the doctor-patient relationship, and substitute a system in
which professionals owe legally enforceable obligations to behave
toward importantly affected individuals with respect for their well-
being. Such a system would be more in keeping with the reasons a
society has professionals and accords them special powers and
privileges than is the present state of affairs. It would also be more
consonant with the realities both of modem medicine and modem
health care delivery and financing than is the current situation.
State ex reL McCloud v. Seier, 567 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Mo. 1978); Shadrick v. Coker,
963 S.W.2d 726, 735-36 (Tenn. 1998). The hospital-patient relationship is also
fiduciary. See Wohlgemuth, 293 P.2d 816. Other health care professionals are also in
fiduciary relationships with their patients. See, e.g., National Society of Genetic
Counselors Code of Ethics Section 11 (reprinted in DIANNE M. BARTELS ET AL., EDS.,
PRESCRIBING OUR FUTURE: ETHICAL CHALLENGES IN GENETIC COUNSELING 170




Autonomy means self-rule.8  A rich philosophical literature
explores the meaning and nature of self-rule in general and
specifically in medicine9, but, as usual, the law shows little awareness
or concern for philosophy. I have suggested elsewhere that two
different meanings seem to attach to autonomy or the dominance of
the self in American medical law.'0 One is liberal individualism, the
idea that each person has a right to make his or her own decisions
about matters that affect that person in important ways and to act to
effectuate those decisions. Freedom to make and act on decisions is
to dominate unless and until one's decisions or actions affect other
persons in a significant way; my right to swing my fist stops at your
nose. This is the notion of liberty traditionally associated with John
Stuart Mill."
A second understanding of autonomy has more to do with privacy
than liberty. What I call physical essentialism is the view that one is
entitled to be let alone, especially to have one's body let alone. More
"primal" than a commitment to liberty, this represents a belief that the
essence of a person is his or her body and that that body must not be
intruded upon. On this view, not only can one not consent to murder
or mayhem, one also cannot consent to invasions of one's bodily
integrity that would change one's basic constitution. Whether this is a
notion of autonomy that has relevance for persons who are capable of
acting as liberal individualists, or whether it is only a default position
8 John Christman, Constructing the Inner Citadel: Recent Work on the
Concept of Autonomy, 99 ETHICS 109, 109-10 (1988); Arthur Kuflik, The
Inalienability ofAutonomy, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 271, 272 ("To be 'autonomous'
is [literally] to be self-legislating or self-regulating").
9 For a survey of work about autonomy see generally Christman, supra note
8. See also GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY (1988);
Susan H. Williams, A Feminist Reassessment of Civil Society, 72 IND. L.J. 417
(1997). See generally IMMANUEL KANT, ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY (James W. Ellington
trans., 1983) (discussing the metaphysics of morals and principles of virtue); JOHN
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Elizabeth Rappaport ed., 1978) (discussing the tension
that arises between majority rule and minority rights). Discussions in the medical
context include, e.g., JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984)
(exploring the decision-making process in a doctor-patient relationship); Marjorie
Maguire Schultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected
Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219 (1985) (examining patient autonomy); Alexander McCall
Smith, Beyond Autonomy, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y. 23 (1997) (exploring
the role of autonomy in medicine).
10 See Roger B. Dworkin, Medical Law and Ethics in the Post-Autonomy
Age, 68 IND. L.J. 727, 733 (1993) (discussing the different views on autonomy)
[hereinafter Medical Law and Ethics].
1 Mill, supra note 9.
[Vol. 13:235
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for those who are incompetent to make choices, is not entirely clear.' 2
Liberal individualism and physical essentialism sometimes, but not
always point in the same direction. Sometimes they lead to
diametrically opposed conclusions. 13
Patient autonomy is clearly the dominant rhetorical value in
American medical law and ethics. In ordinary situations (i.e., those in
which the patient is a competent adult and in which issues involving
sex, reproduction, experimentation, organ transplantation, or efforts to
facilitate or hasten death are not involved), this is demonstrated most
clearly by the law of informed consent. Tracing its lineage to
Cardozo's oft quoted dictum, "Every human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body," 14 the cause of action has flourished since the early 1970's.
Even before Cardozo and the 1970's a cause of action existed for
unconsented medical touchings. Thus, in the classic old case of Mohr
v. Williams'5 a patient was held to have a cause of action against her
surgeon for failing to wake her from anesthesia to get a new consent
before he performed the same operation on her right ear that she had
agreed to have on her left ear. The surgery was skillfully performed,
and it is clear that the patient was being compensated for her loss of
autonomy, not for a form of medical malpractice.
Nonetheless, the informed consent cause of action lay largely
dormant until it was resurrected first by a couple of cases in the late
1950'S16 and then by the landmark cases of Canterbury v. Spence
17
and Cobbs v. Grant'8 in 1972. Those cases reformulated the cause of
action from one for battery to one for negligence, with two important
effects: Patients could no longer recover without proving that the
doctor's failure to obtain informed consent had caused the patient to
12 See, In re Valerie N., 707 P.2d 770, 781-93 (Cal. 1985) (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting). A discussion of this case occurs at text accompanying notes 181-93,
infra.
13 An excellent example appears in a comparison of the majority and
dissenting opinions of the case cited above. E.g., compare In re Valerie N., 707 P.2d
760, 762 (Cal. 1985), with In re Valene N., 707 P.2d at 781-83 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
Schloendorffv. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
'5 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905).
16 See, e.g., Salgo v. Leland Stanford., Jr., Bd. Of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181
(Cal. App. 1957) (holding that while a physician has a duty to disclose the facts
necessary to form an informed decision, the physician has the discretion to determine
the extent of these facts). See generally Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1103
(Kan. 1960) (recognizing a claim for unauthorized treatment when the doctor fails to
provide information regarding the consequences of a particular course of treatment).
'7 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
'8 502 P.2d 1.
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suffer physical injury, and any doubt about the applicability of the
doctor's malpractice insurance was removed. Informed consent thus
became a branch of the law of malpractice, useful mostly when the
patient suffered an injury but could not prove that the doctor had
performed any medical act negligently.'
9
Despite the requirement of physical injury, modem informed
consent cases still talk about informed consent as serving the value of
patient autonomy. 20 Some of them explicitly excoriate paternalism. 2'
Many reject the idea that the standard for the amount of information a
doctor is required to disclose is the amount a reasonable doctor would
ordinarily disclose and the accompanying rule that would require
expert testimony to establish how much information that would be.22
19 See Alan Meisel, Expansion of Liability for Medical Accidents: From
Negligence to Strict Liability by Way of Informed Consent, 56 NEB. L. REV. 51 (1977)
(discussing how the use of res ipsa loquitar and informed consent are causing a shift
from a negligence to a strict liability standard in medical malpractice); Meisel, supra
note 1, at 1399 and n. 27, citing Kenneth W. Simons, Assumption of Risk and Consent
in the Law of Torts: A Theory of Full Preference, 67 B.U.L. REV. 213, 231 n. 60
(1987) (noting new importance of showing consent given).
20 See, e.g., Matthies v. Mastromonaco, 709 A.2d 238, 249 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1998) (recognizing New Jersey's "prudent patient" informed consent
standard is "based primarily upon maturing concepts of patient autonomy and
individual self-determination"); Schrieber v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 579 N.W.2d
730, 734 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) ("Basic to the informed consent doctrine is that a
physician has a legal, ethical and moral duty to respect patient autonomy"); Feeley v.
Baer, 679 N.E.2d 180, 184 (Mass. 1997) (explaining that the informed consent
doctrine is based on the rationale that "autonomy demands that a competent adult
consent to any invasion of his or her being"); Bankert v. United States, 937 F. Supp.
1169, 1173 (D. Md. 1996) ("The informed consent doctrine holds that a physician has
a legal, ethical and moral duty to respect patient autonomy").
21 See, e.g., Perez v. Wyeth Labs, Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1255 (N.J. 1999)
("Informed consent requires a patient-based decision rather than the [paternalistic
approach of the 1970s"); Culbertson v. Mernitz, 602 N.E.2d 98, 104 (Ind. 1992)
(quoting 1992 code of Medical Ethics, prepared by the Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association) ("Social policy does not accept
the paternalistic view that the physician may remain silent because divulgence might
prompt the patient to forego needed therapy").
22 E.g., Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 783-85, 792 (reasoning that informing a
patient of dangers and options is often a non-medical decision and should therefore be
governed by a standard of reasonable care under the circumstances); Cobbs v. Grant,
502 P.2d I, 10-11 (Cal. 1972); Matthies,709 A.2d 247; Largey v. Rothman, 540 A.2d
504, 505 (N.J. 1988) (affirming the "prudent patient" standard); Cox v. Bd. of Adm'rs
of Tulane Educ. Fund, 716 So.2d 441 (La. App. 1998) (requiring patient to provide
expert testimony to establish a prima facie case); Caputa v. Antiles, 686 A.2d 356,
361-62 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (the court used the reasonable patient
standard to measure doctor's disclosure duty and said expert not used to establish
disclosure duty); Rowinsky v. Sperling, 681 A.2d 785, 789 (Pa. Super. 1996) (holding
surgeon liable for failing to provide enough information to satisfy a reasonable patient
[Vol. 13:235
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"The weighing of ... risks against the individual subjective fears and
hopes of the patient is not an expert skill. Such evaluation and
decision is a non-medical judgment reserved to the patient alone. 23
Some cases have gone so far as to require doctors to inform patients
of the risks of not having procedures performed24 and of the financial
impact of medical decisions in terms of allowing the patient adequate
time to get his affairs in order before his death.25
In more dramatic situations patient autonomy also is said to be the
value the law is attempting to serve. Thus, a woman's right to obtain
a pre-viability abortion without the state placing an undue burden in
her path is largely justified by the assertion that the right to define
one's concept of the existence and meaning of the universe and the
mystery of human life is at the heart of the concept of liberty. 26 In
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, not only the joint opinion of Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter,27 but also the separate opinions of
Justices Blackmun28 and Stevens, 29 emphasized the importance of
maternal autonomy, which is not surprising given Justice Blackmun's
earlier quotation from one of Justice Stevens's opinions that, "it is this
general principle, the 'moral fact that a person belongs to himself and
not others nor to society as a whole' . . . that is found in the
Constitution. 3 °
The widely recognized right of patients to reject life-saving or
life-prolonging medical treatment is sometimes said to be rooted in
the common law3' and sometimes in the Constitution32, but the right to
in the plaintiff patient's position).
23 Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 10 (emphasis added).
24 E.g., Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902 (Cal. 1980); Matthies, 709 A.2d at
251.
25 See Kimmel v. Dayrit, 693 A.2d 1287, 1295-96 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1997),
qfrd as modified by 712 A.2d 1129 (N.J. 1998) (holding a patient should not be
informed so that personal decisions can be made); contra, Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d
589 (Cal. 1993) (holding a doctor need not inform a patient about non-medical
interests).
26 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
27 Id. at 851, 856-57, 896.
28 Id. at 926-28 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part).
29 Id. at 915-16, 919-20 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
30 Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 549 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 777 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
31 See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (N.J. 1985) (recognizing a
common law right to self-determination as the basis for the right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment); Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 427 (holding that there is a general
right to refuse medical treatment in some circumstances); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64,
2003]
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reject medical care is treated as the flip side of the right to consent to
medical care and as an important feature of each patient's autonomy.33
Informed consent is the primary safeguard in the law of human
experimentation. Federally funded research with human subjects
must be approved in advance by local Institutional Review Boards.34
Federal regulations give those Boards almost no guidance about
evaluating proposals to assure that research is acceptably safe.35 They
provide detailed and specific requirements for obtaining informed
consent,36 however, with the result that the focus in deciding whether
to approve research is the adequacy of the consent rather than the
safety of the experiment. Special regulations exist to protect potential
human subjects (fetuses, 37 children, 38 prisoners39) who are thought to
lack the capacity to make an autonomous decision about whether to
participate in research.
The dominance of patient autonomy as the value apparently being
fostered by American medical law is nowhere more evident than in
cases involving persons who are incompetent to make their own
medical decisions. Here surrogates must make decisions for patients.
Depending on the circumstances the decision maker may be a court,4°
a parent,4 ' a guardian, 42 a health care representative, 43 an attorney-in-
70 (N.Y. 1981); Estate of Longway v. Conty. Convalescent Ctr., 549 N.E.2d 292, 297
(II1. 1989) (holding a common law right to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration
exists in Illinois).
32 See, e.g, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-
79 (1990) (discussing constitutional provisions protecting liberty interests); In re
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 662-64 (N.J. 1976), cert. deined sub nom. Garger v. New
Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (finding that the right of privacy includes a patient's right
to refuse medical treatment in some cases).
33 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270 (discussing the right to refuse treatment); In
re Storar, 420 N.E.2d at 70; In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d at 297 (holding
patients have a common law right to refuse treatment).
3" 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101,46.103, 46.107, 46.122 (Oct. 2001).
3' 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (Oct. 2002).
36 45 C.F.R. § 46.116-17 (Oct. 2002).
3' 45 C.F.R. § 46.201-07 (Oct. 2002).
38 45 C.F.R. § 46.401-09 (Oct. 2002).
'9 45 C.F.R. § 46.301-06 (Oct. 2002).
40 See In re C.A., 603 N.E.2d 1171 (111. App. I Dist. 1992) (discussing the
impact of the surrogate Health Care Act on courts); Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 433
(noting the court's power to make decisions for persons under the court's protective
jurisdiction).
41 See In re Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d 1009 (N.Y. 1979) (discussing parents'
right to rear their children and the level of deference given to their choice of medical
treatment for the child); In re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905, 911-12 (Pa. 1996) (holding that a
substitute decision maker may determine whether the patient would have refused
treatment when the patient is incompetent); DeGrella ex rel. Parrent v. Elston, 858
S.W.2d 698 (Ky. 1993) (allowing a parent to make the decision to take her child off
[Vol. 13:235
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fact,4 4 or, occasionally, an elaborate combination of persons and
institutions.45 Whoever makes the decision, however, autonomy is
said to be the primary substantive value at stake.46
Usually, the concern is for the autonomy of the incompetent
patient.47 However, when the reason for incompetence is merely
nonage, courts often defer instead to the autonomy of the patient's
48parents. Parents are usually allowed to make medical decisions for
their children. 49 This is because parents are assumed to know more
and have better judgment than children, because parents are assumed
to care more about their own children than anybody else does, and
because some entitlements are thought to accompany the obligations
of parenthood.5 0 Thus, ordinarily parents must be given the same kind
and quality of information that an adult must receive under the
doctrine of informed consent, and then the parents may decide
life support).
42 See, e.g., Matter of Warren, 858 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Mo. App.1993) (finding
statutory authority for a guardian to make medical decisions without specific court
authorization).
43 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-36-1-2, 16-36-1-5, 16-36-1-8 (West
2001).
44 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 30-5-6-1 to -5 (West 1994) (allowing, but not
requiring, the attorney in fact to exercise powers of attorney).
' E.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985) (suggesting the decision-
making process include the guardian, and ombudsman and, if necessary, the court).
46 See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663-64 (N.J. 1976) (finding that when
the patient is not competent to accept or decline treatment, the guardian may assert
the interests of the patient and vindicate her right to privacy); Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d
at 430 (explaining that the focus is the wants and needs of the individual invovled); In
re Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760, 773 (Cal. 1985) (noting constitutional guarantee as an
assurance citizen protected in right to use his mind and body as he chooses).
47 See Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664 (holding that because the patient was
incompetent, "independent right of choice" may be asserted by her guardian);
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 430 (emphasizing substituted judgments of the individual).
See generally Valerie N., 707 P.2d at 762 (court noting handicapped still have same
autonomy rights under the Constitution).
48 E.g., In re Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 1013 (N.Y. 1979) (stating that
while the state may intervene on the child's behalf if his or her life is in jeopardy, the
court gives a high level of deference to the parents' decision as to treatment). See
Bowen v. American Hospital Association, 476 U.S. 610 (1986) (holding that,
pursuant to section 504 of Rehabilitation Act of 1973, parental consent is required
when the youth is incompetent).
49 E.g., Matter of Baby K., 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1030-31 (E.D. Va. 1993)
(discussing the constitutional rights of parents to make medical decisions for their
minor children). See also ROGER B. DWORKIN, LIMITS: THE ROLE OF THE LAW IN
BIOETHICAL DECISION MAKING, 140-41 (1996) [hereinafter LIMITS] (discussing the
interaction between law and social issues created by technology).




whether to accept treatment for the child. Parental decisions are
almost never overruled. Some courts state explicitly that the
obligation of parents is to make an informed, caring decision (like one
would make for oneself), not necessarily the best decision."
Deference to parents sometimes goes so far as to allow parents to
insist on using medically disapproved alleged cures as long as they
can find one licensed physician to support their choice. 2
When a patient is incompetent for some reason other than nonage,
the patient's own autonomy usually appears to be the value courts try
to serve. Thus, substituted judgment, a doctrine under which decision
makers are supposed to decide what the incompetent person would
choose for himself if he were competent, is the most frequent standard
applied to decisions about whether to withhold or withdraw life
support from incompetent persons. 53 Some states require a high
degree of certainty that a person would choose to reject lifesaving
medical care,54 and the United States Supreme Court has upheld that
approach.55 Others follow the concept to absurd extremes, requiring
surrogate decision makers to decide what a person with a mental age
of 2 who had never been competent would decide if he were
competent for one instant during which he understood everything
about his condition, including the fact that he was incompetent.
5 6
The leading contender for a different substantive test of whether
to withhold or withdraw life support from an incompetent person is
the best interests of the patient,57 but that test, which makes no
pretense of promoting patient autonomy, is seldom applied. On the
51 E.g., In re Felicia D., 693 N.Y.S.2d 41 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (explaining
that the standard parents should be measured is whether they have provided their
children w/adequate medical treatment in light of the circumstances and not whether
the parents provided the "right" medical treatment). Cf, Newmark v. Williams, 588
A.2d 1108 (Del. 1990) (deferring to parents' religiously based objection to very
intrusive medical care).
52 See Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d at 1014 (weighing parents' reliance on one
doctor's opinion over another's conflicting majority opinion in determining whether
their chosen treatment constituted neglect).
53 For a discussion and criticism of this approach, see LIMITS, supra note 49,
at 118-19, 188.
54 E.g., Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (finding that
guardians do not have the authority to withdraw hydration and nutrition).
55 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
56 See Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 431 (assuming that the decision would be
made by the incompetent person as if they were competent). For a critic's clever
response to this absurdity see text accompanying n. 243, infra.
57 See generally LIMITS, supra note 49, at 118 (discussing the objective
standard).
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Supreme Court only Justice Stevens supports the best interests of the
patient test in death facilitation cases.58
Thus, patient (or patients' parents') autonomy seems firmly
entrenched as the dominant value in American medical law. This is
not surprising. It reflects not only longstanding American traditions
of individualism, free choice, and a desire to be let alone (don't tread
on me), but also American populism's distrust of authority and
expertise. Americans are a suspicious yet hopeful lot, simultaneously
refusing to recognize the superior understanding of professionals and
seeking the perfect relief that experts cannot provide. Thus they
increasingly rely on alternative medicine 9 even when most alternative
practices cannot be demonstrated to be effective, 60 and when many are
harmful. 6' And they insist on believing that they are in control of
decisions about their medical care and that the law will support that
control. In fact, despite all the talk, however, the law does not support
patient control over medical decisions, sometimes for good reasons
and sometimes for bad. The rhetoric of autonomy facilitates treading
on the interests of individual patients while providing an excuse for
ignoring important interests of other persons.
A. What Have You Done For Me Lately?: Autonomy and the Patient
Patient autonomy is supposed to protect patient control over
medical decision making or the integrity of patients' bodies or both.
Most of the time it is clear that patient control over decision making is
what courts mean by autonomy. Yet the cases themselves do little to
58 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 331 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
59 See Kathleen M. Boozang, Western Medicine Opens the Door to
Alternative Medicine, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 185, 186 & n. 5, 187-88 (1998) (discussing
the rise in patient use of alternative medicine and openness to experiment with
unproven and unconventional therapies).
60 Id. at 188. See also Ryan J. Huxtable, Book Review, 39 JURIMETRICS J.
327, 332 (1999) (noting reliance of public on unproven alternative medicine therapies
despite lack of scientific support for therapy).
61 See, e.g.. "Ontario Coroners to Track Alt. Med. Cases", Nat'l Council
Against Health Fraud, Inc., NCRHI Newsletter (No. 3, Vol. 23, pg. 51, May 1, 2000);
Jane E. Brady, Personal Health: Taking Stock of Mysteries of Medicine, N.Y. TIMES,
May 5, 1998, at F7 (discussing the effectiveness of alternative therapies); Gina
Kolata, On Fringes of Health Care, Untested Therapies Thrive, N.Y. TIMES, June 17,
1996, at AI (noting that risks of alternative therapies can include death); J. Warren
Willey 11, Insulin as an Anabolic Aid?, 25 PHYSICIAN & SPORTSMED. 103, 103-04
(Oct. 1997); Victor Herbert, Melatonin: Harms from a Pseudo Cure-All, 30
NUTRITION TODAY 245 (1995); Michael Casey, Alternative Therapies Taking
Expanded Role, Managed Care Newsperspective (Mar. 18, 1999).
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facilitate patient centered decision making, and relevant statutes also
promote other values at the expense of patient autonomy.
For example, only licensed practitioners of "healing arts" that the
various state legislatures deem acceptable are allowed to diagnose and
treat patients.62 Only drugs and medical devices that the Food and
Drug Administration has decided are safe and effective may be
entered into interstate commerce,63 and thus, as a practical matter,
only such drugs and devices are available to treat patients. If patient
autonomy rather than the protection of patients from injury and fraud
were the value being served, neither of these restrictions would apply.
Patients would be able to consult whomever they choose about their
health, and practitioners would be free to use snake oil, laetrile, or
whatever alleged curative agents their patients preferred to receive.
If patient autonomy were really the dominant value in patient
health care law, then doctors and patients would be free to bargain
about the quality of care the doctor would provide to the patient.
Malpractice law would be contract law, not torts, as one of the leading
proponents of individual autonomy in many aspects of society
advocated long ago. 64 Yet malpractice law remains a matter of tort as
we attempt to maintain the fiction that all patients are entitled to the
same level of care. Everyone is entitled to reasonable care, not the
amount of care he might bargain for in order to save money and
exercise his autonomous preference for other goods over high priced
medical care. Even as managed care moves us inexorably in the
direction of different standards of care for different patients,
65
autonomous patient decisions are not what is involved. Rather the
government, private insurers, and employers make decisions about the
level of care that members of various groups will receive.66 The
decisions are made in an across-the-board fashion at the time that
62 See Michael H. Cohen, A Fixed Star in Health Care Reform: The
Emerging Paradigm of Holistic Healing, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 79, app. at 155-59 (1995)
(listing statutes).
63 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000). See also 21 C.F.R. § 310 et seq (2002) (listing
the requirements for new drugs).
6 Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 87.
65 Recognizing the dangers of differential standards of care, Troyen Brennan
argues that patients must be treated as a single class that must enjoy special and equal
status. Troyen A. Brennan, An Ethical Perspective on Health Care Insurance
Reform. 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 37, 56 (1993).
66 See Mehlman, supra note 7, at 351 ("Third-party payers, such as
government entitlement programs, insurers, and employers are beginning to second-
guess physicians' decisions by requiring prior approval before services are provided
to patients or before the physicians' claims for reimbursement are paid").
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health care plans are entered. Once the basic decisions have been
made, the level of care the patient receives is imposed by the insurer
or negotiated between the insurer and the provider. Patient protection,
such as it is, comes from the law of torts. Patient autonomy has
nothing to do with the matter.
The law of informed consent presents the clearest example of the
absence of patient autonomy in the midst of maximal autonomy
rhetoric. In theory, patient autonomy is the value being served by the
requirement that doctors obtain a patient's informed consent before
they perform a procedure on the patient. Yet that is plainly not the
case. First, modem cases treat the cause of action for failure to obtain
informed consent as a negligence claim.67 That means that the patient
cannot recover without proving that he has suffered a physical
injury. 68 The injury to the patient's autonomy, which exists regardless
of whether the patient was physically injured, is worth nothing. To
put it another way, a physician will not be liable for failing to obtain
informed consent and depriving the patient of autonomy unless the
physician is unlucky enough to have a low probability bad outcome
occur.
Second, the amount of information that a physician must provide
in order to make a patient's consent to a procedure informed enough
to prevent liability on the physician is either (depending on the
jurisdiction) the amount of information that a reasonable physician
would provide69 or all material information, 70 that is, the amount of
67 E.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1972) (treating lack of informed
consent claim as a negligible action); Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014, 1020 n. 4 (Md.
1977) (discussing the doctrine of informed consent). See also Banks v. Wright, 721
So.2d 1063, 1064-65 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (citing several secondary sources to support
its decision that a lack of informed consent is a negligence claim).
68 E.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790 (D.C. Cir.1972) (requiring
a causal connection between lack of informed consent and harm from that omission);
Cobbs, 502 P.2d at I I (indicating patient must have suffered physical injury to bring a
lack of informed consent claim).
69 E.g., Pardy v. U.S., 783 F.2d 710, 714 (7th Cir. 1986) (applying Illinois
law); Cohen v. United States, 540 F. Supp. 1175 (D. Ariz. 1982) (applying Texas law;
holding a doctor is responsible to disclose what a reasonable physician would
disclose); Bloskas v. Murray, 646 P.2d 907, 913 (Colo. 1982) (citing the standard of a
reasonable medical practitioner who knew or should have known that a particular
factor was important to a patients' decision); Sherwood v. Carter, 805 P.2d 452, 461
(Id. 1991) (finding the informed consent statute requires the professional medical
standard for disclosure).
70 E.g., Canterbuy, 464 F.2d at 786-87 (stating that material information is
the correct standard because it most adequately addresses the patient's needs in giving
informed consent); Weiss v. Green, 129 F. Supp. 742 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (applying
Pennsylvania law); Cobbs, 502 P.2d at I (stating doctors must reveal all information
material to a patient's decision); Ketchup v. Howard, 543 S.E.2d 371, 378 (Ga. App.
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information a reasonable patient would want to have in order to make
a rational decision whether to allow the procedure. 7' Neither standard
promotes patient autonomy. A reasonable physician standard
addresses the needs and practices of the medical profession, not the
choices of a patient. The materiality standard is an objective standard
that requires the same amount of information to be delivered to all
patients. A standard would have to be subjective, focusing on the
particular needs, desires, and quirks of the individual patient, to serve
patient autonomy.72 The whole point of autonomy is that each person
is supposed to be able to make his own decisions, based on his own
considerations, no matter how unreasonable those decisions and
considerations may be. 7
Even the minimal bow to autonomy of requiring that any
information be provided is often honored in the breach as several
exceptions exist to the requirement that doctors provide significant
information to their patients. Doctors are said not to have to provide
material information for simple or common procedures when it is
common knowledge that the risks are of very low incidence.74 While
this may make good practical sense, it has nothing to do with
protecting patient autonomy. Almost no procedure is common to a
patient, so if the exception only applies when the patient has a great
deal of experience with the procedure, the exception will be almost
worthless. Yet if the question is whether the procedure is common to
the doctor or is a procedure that is commonly performed in the United
States, then the exception provides a gigantic loophole in the
protection of patients' autonomy. The same can be said of the
requirement that it be common knowledge that the risk is of very low
incidence. Again the question is common to whom. Only if the
2000) (holding that physicians must reveal material risks associated with a particular
procedure or treatment); Carr v. Strode, 904 P.2d 489 (Haw. 1995) (holding that a
physician's failure to inform patient and his wife that less than one percent of
vasectomy patients father children after surgery was not material); Pauscher v. Iowa
Methodist Med. Ctr., 408 N.W.2d 355, 359 (Iowa 1987) (holding that patient must be
given material information to enable "a truly informed and intelligent decision");
Sard, 379 A.2d 1014 (discussing the materiality of information withheld by physician
when informing patient about sterilization procedure).
7 1 For a collection of state authorities and the standards they adopt, see the
Appendix in Ketchup, 543 S.E.2d at 381-86.
72 See Morris, supra note 7, at 328-29 (explaining that the standard should be
measured by the patient's individual needs).
71 Id. at 329.
74 E.g., Cobbs, 502 P.2d at II (holding doctors are not required to reveal
material information for common procedures with low incidence of risk); Sard, 379
A.2d at 1022 (discussing the materiality of information provided by physicians). See
also Pauscher, 408 N.W.2d at 360 (listing exceptions tot eh duty of disclosure).
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patient personally knows that the risk is of very low incidence is the
patient's autonomy being served.
Physicians do not have to provide information to a patient in an
emergency.75 Again this makes good sense, but it has nothing to do
with autonomy. It makes good sense because most reasonable people
want to receive treatment that will save their lives or prevent serious
disability, and the law understands that doing what most people want
and avoiding death and disability is a good idea. This is deference to
objectivity, majority rule, and the value of good medical care. It has
nothing to do with autonomy, which would attempt to ascertain
whether each particular patient confronting a health care emergency
really wanted to be treated in the way the doctors had in mind.
Under the so-called therapeutic privilege, a doctor does not have
to provide information to the patient if the doctor reasonably believes
that the receipt of the information itself will harm the patient.76 In
other words if being told that a proposed treatment poses a risk of
nerve damage is reasonably likely to cause the patient to suffer a heart
attack, the doctor does not have to tell the patient about the risk of
nerve damage. I have always doubted whether any situations that are
true examples of the therapeutic privilege exist, but if they do, the
privilege is a high water mark for paternalism, a striking example of
denying information and choice to a patient for the patient's own
good.
The only exception to the information requirement that serves
autonomy is the exception that allows a physician to withhold
information if the patient has asked not to be informed.77 While
voluntarily disabling oneself from acting autonomously may seem an
odd way to exercise one's autonomy, it can be understood as an
75 E.g., Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 788-89 (noting that the physician should
attempt to obtain a relative's consent if feasible); Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 10 (stating
doctors are not required to reveal information in emergencies); Sard, 379 A.2d at
1022.
76 Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789; Sard, 379 A.2d at1022. For an over-broad
statement of the privilege that, if taken seriously, would provide a gigantic loophole
in the disclosure requirement, see Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 12 ("[a] disclosure need not be
made . . . when a doctor can prove ... he relied upon facts which would demonstrate
to a reasonable man the disclosure would have so seriously upset the patient that the
patient would not have been able to dispassionately weigh the risks to refusing to
undergo the recommended treatment").
77 See, e.g., Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 12 (stating doctors need not share
information with patients who have asked not to be informed); Laskowitz v. CIBA
Vision Corp., 632 N.Y.S.2d 845, 848 (App. Div. 1995) (listing four defenses under
law for failure to secure a patient's informed consent).
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expression of an individual's preference for psychological comfort
(ignorance is bliss) over the need to make hard choices.
Finally, if a situation exists in which a doctor was required to
provide information and failed to do so, the patient consented, and the
procedure injured the patient, the patient still cannot recover without
proving causation.78 That means that the patient must prove that if he
had been properly informed, he would not have consented to the
procedure.7 9 The problem is obvious: With 20/20 hindsight even an
honest patient is likely to believe that he would not have consented if
he had known that the disaster that befell him was a possibility.8°
Therefore, many courts refuse to allow the patient's own testimony
about what he would have done to get the patient's case to the jury.8'
Instead they say that the question is what a reasonable patient would
have done if properly informed.82 Again, the focus on the objective
reasonable patient standard destroys all pretense that the individual,
subjective patient's autonomy is being served.83
Surrogate decision making also does not serve the value of
autonomy. Obviously, a decision by somebody other than the patient
is an example of (often desirable) imposition on the patient, decision
making for the patient, not by the patient. No matter how one dresses
it up, A deciding for B is not an exercise of B's autonomy.
Even deference to parental autonomy in the context of medical
decision making for children is far from universal. First, all the
features of informed consent law that militate against the autonomy of
competent adult patients also militate against the autonomy of parents
acting for their children.
In addition, exceptions exist to the rule that the consent of a parent
is required to provide medical care to a child. Parents' refusals to
consent or the absence of parental consent are overridden in some
circumstances. As with adult patients consent is assumed when an
emergency exists if the parents are not reasonably available.84
" E.g., Cobbs, 503 P.2d at II (holding patients must prove a causal link





13 See Morris, supra note 7, at 330-31 (explaining that the patient is free to
decide on the treatment and the standard for the physician to disclose should not be
the reasonable patient standard but should be one that is measured by the patient's
own needs).
84 Alexander M. Capron, The Competence of Children as Self-Deciders in
Biomedical Interventions, in WHO SPEAKS FOR THIS CHILD: THE PROBLEMS OF PROXY
CONSENT 62, 95-114 (W. Gaylin & R. Macklin eds., 1982).
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Parental consent is not required to provide treatment to mature 85 or
emancipated minors86 or often in cases of gunshot wounds,
87 drug 88
and alcohol abuse,89 pregnancy 9° and venereal disease.9' In addition,
elaborate rules exist about the role parents may play when their minor
92daughters seek abortions.
The mature and emancipated minor exceptions are merely efforts
to use status rather than age to determine competence. An
emancipated minor is essentially treated like an adult with the same
degree of deference and lack of deference to his autonomy that an
adult has.93 The mature minor rule is a bit trickier. There is no clear
definition of a mature minor. Basically, a mature minor is a smart, old
minor. Such a person is allowed to make some relatively trivial
decisions about his own health care. 94 He can consent to have his arm
set, but not to risky brain surgery. This rule gives mature minors
more authority to exercise their autonomy than immature minors, and
correspondingly reduces the authority of their parents, but it retains
substantial parental control and rejection of the minor's autonomy.
The abortion rules represent the ambivalence the Supreme Court
feels about abortion.95 The other exceptions, which are also chinks in
85 Id. at 75-76, 95-114 (table listing the various exceptions to the parental







92 See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990)
(upholding a statute that prohibits an abortion on an unemancipated female under
eighteen unless (1) one parent consents in writing; or (2) the physician has given
notice to one parent or a guardian; or (3) a court has given authority based on
maturity, parental abuse of the minor, or a finding that notice would not be in the
minor's best interest; or (4) the court has failed to act fast enough); H.L. v. Matheson,
450 U.S. 398 (1981) (upholding a requirement that a minor's parents be "notified if
possible" for a minor seeking an abortion who is living with and dependent on her
parents, is not emancipated, and has made no claim or showing with regard to her
maturity or her relationship with her parents); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979)
(upholding a parental consent requirement for abortion if the state provides a minor a
satisfactory alternative to obtaining parental consent); Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72-75 (1976) (invalidating a Missouri statute that required
parental consent before a minor could obtain an abortion). For a more complete
discussion of minors and parental consent in abortion situations, see LIMITS, supra
note 49, at 33-36.
93 Capron, supra note 84, at 65-69.
94 Id. at 69-76.
95 See LIMITS, supra note 49, at 33-36 (discussing various court decisions in
this area, emphasizing the difficulty in forming any type of consensus).
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the armor of autonomy, either represent a preference for health over
parental autonomy 96 or a recognition of the needs of public health97 or
mistrust of parents whose children have been engaged in forbidden
activities.98
Finally, parents' refusals to permit treatment for seriously
impaired newborns are sometimes subject to judicial oversight99, thus
casting further doubt on whether either the infant's or the parents'
autonomy interests are being served.
B. Autonomy in Controversial Cases: Abortion and Death
Facilitation
The real test of the law's commitment to a value is its willingness
to foster that value in highly controversial cases. It is easy to spout
autonomy talk when all that is at stake is whether a patient who
cannot prove negligent medical performance should be compensated
for medically caused injuries. Even there, as we have seen, the law's
commitment to the rhetoric of autonomy far exceeds its commitment
96 Capron, supra note 84, at 63-64. Capron discusses two more general
exceptions, the "physician-judgment" exception and the "best interests" exception.
The physician-judgment exception, embodied in the statutes of seven states, says that
if in the physician's judgment an attempt to secure parental consent would increase
the risk to the minor's health, consent is then not required, even if the condition
requiring care is not an emergency. Similarly, the "best-interests" exception is
generally invoked when parents refuse to consent to a "relatively simple" procedure
and failure to give treatment will result in substantial risk of death or permanent
impairment of health. Id.
9' Id. at 75.
98 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17A-4 (West 2002) (authorizing a minor
who appears or professes to be infected with a venereal disease, is the victim of a
sexual assault, or is using or is dependent on drugs or alcohol to consent to treatment
as if that minor had reached the age of majority); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6929(b) (2003)
("[a] minor who is 12 years of age or older may consent to medical care and
counseling relating to the diagnosis and treatment of a drug or alcohol related
problem"); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-133.01 (West 2003) (a "minor twelve years
of age or older who is found, upon diagnosis of a licensed physician, to be under the
influence of a dangerous drug or narcotic, which includes withdrawal symptoms, may
be considered an emergency case and such minor is to be regarded as having
consented to hospital or medical care needed for treatment for such"); ALA. CODE §
22-1 ]A-19 (Michie 1997) (minor 12 years of age or older who may have come into
contact with any sexually transmitted disease as designated by the State Board of
Health may give consent to the furnishing of medical care related to the diagnosis or
treatment of such disease).
99 See generally The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5106a, 5106g (2000) (discussing funding qualifications). See also Infant Doe v.
Baker, No. 482 S 140 (Ind. Ct. App. May 27, 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961
(1983).
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to the value of autonomy. How much less likely it is that the law will
truly pursue patient autonomy when other hot button issues are at
stake.
Of course, the hottest hot button of them all remains abortion.
Twenty-nine years after Roe v. Wadel °° abortion concerns still cause
violence,' 0' litmus test voting and decisions about judicial
appointments, 102 unceasing efforts at legislative nullification of
Supreme Court decisions, 0 3 skewed legal responses to other issues
10o Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
101 For instance, the fatal shooting of Dr. Barnett Slepian, an abortion
provider, outside his home in Buffalo, NY on October 23, 1998, is just one well-
publicized incident of violence spurred by the abortion controversy. Joseph Berger,
Abortion Foe is Charged in Killing of Clinic Doctor, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1999, at B5.
102 The abortion issue weighed heavily in the Senate's respective confirmation
and rejection of current Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and former
Supreme Court Justice candidate Robert Bork. Regarding his failed Supreme Court
nomination, Bork himself has said that "Roe v. Wade was probably the litmus issue."
Legends in the Law: A Conversation with Robert H. Bork, Bar Report (District of
Columbia Bar), Dec/Jan 1998, available at http://www.dcbar.org/ (last visited
December 30, 2001) (on file with author). Justice O'Connor, in her confirmation
hearing, responded positively that she was against abortion, and, according to
Republican Policy Committee, President Reagan "assured prolife (sic) Senators that
they will not be unhappy with this nominee." Senate Vote Record Analysis,
O'Connor Nomination, UNITED STATES SENATE REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE, 9 7th
Congress, 1st Session, Vote No. 274, Sept. 215 1981, available at
http://www.senate.gov/-rpc/rva/971/971274.htm (last visited December 29, 2001) (on
file with author).
'03 See, e.g., A.C. 1085, 2 101h Leg., 2002 Sess. (NJ 2002), available at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us (last updated Mar. 12, 2002) (providing that any person
who intentionally kills an "unborn child" at any stage of gestation is subject to the
same penalties as those convicted of murder, while excluding acts of the pregnant
woman, including abortion); S.B. 2210, 2002 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2002), available
at http://billstatus.ls.state.ms.us/2002/html/history/sb/sb2210.htm (last modified Feb.
5, 2002) (requiring a battery of physical tests, such as a family history of breast
cancer, and psychological tests, such as strong religious convictions, on a pregnant
woman prior to the performance of an abortion to determine whether she is capable of
making an "informed" choice. There are criminal and civil penalties for non-
compliance. This bill was introduced and referred to the Senate Committee on Public
Health and Welfare on Jan. 10, 2002); H.B. 33, 2002 Leg. (Ms. 2002), available at
http://bilistatus.ls.state.ms.us/documents/2002/html/HB/000I -0099/HBOO331N.htm
(introduced Jan 8, 2002, referred to House Comm. On Universities and Colleges)
(prohibits University of MS Medical Center School of Medicine from performing or
teaching how to perform an abortion); H.R. 6003, 2002 Sess. (Kan. 2002), available
at http://www.kslegislative.org/cgi-bin/fulltext/index.cgi (last visited Mar. 17, 2002)
(introduced Jan. 25, 2002, referred to House Comm on Fed. And State Affairs) (states
that unborn children have an equal and unalienable right to life from
conception/fertilization and that allowing the termination of "lives of innocent human
beings even before birth" violates the Kansas Constitution. Requires KS Attorney
General to seek final resolution regarding abortion in front of the KS Supreme Court);
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such as those posed by genetic advances'0 4  and assisted
reproduction, 0 5 and a high level of irrationality, fury, and wasted
energy. Moreover, the Supreme Court itself continues to manifest
ambivalence about abortion0 6 . What chance is there that autonomy
will flower in such contaminated soil?
Before Roe v. Wade and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton,
07
abortion had been a crime in every state. 0 8 Traditionally, the only
exception was that abortion was permitted to save the life of the
mother. 09 In the years leading to Roe and Doe eighteen states had
modified their criminal anti-abortion laws. Four of those states
permitted abortion for any reason until about the time of fetal
viability.' Fourteen had adopted less far-reaching statutes",
modeled after a proposal in the Model Penal Code." 2 Those statutes
expanded the exceptions to the criminalization of abortion so that
S.B. 926 2001 Leg. (Mass. 2001), available at http://www.state.ma.us/legis/legis.htm
(last visited March 7, 2002) (introduced Jan. 3, 2001, set aside for study by the Joint
Comm. on Judiciary June 19, 2001) (prohibits a physician from performing abortion
if pregnancy has reached greater than 16 weeks, health of the mother exception); H.B.
4128 2001 Leg. (Mass. 2001) (introduced Apr. 26, 2001, set aside for study in Joint
Comm. on Judiciary, June 26, 2001) Id. For a comprehensive list of abortion
legislation pending in all states, see The National Abortion Rights Action League, at
http://www.naral.org (last visited Mar. 1, 2002).
104 See LIMITS, supra note 49, at 100 (discussing the impact of the abortion
controversy).
105 Id. at 61-84, for a discussion about the law and alternative reproductive
techniques.
106 Compare Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989)
(holding that a statute prohibiting use of public employees and facilities to perform
abortions was not invalid since it placed no governmental obstacle in the path of a
woman who chose to have an abortion) with Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992) (offering a thorough explanation of the rationale behind a woman's right
to an abortion). See also Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). See also Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622 (1979) (demonstrating the ambivalence of the Court as it wrestles with a
minor's abortion rights question). Further discussion of this Bellotti challenge may be
seen in LIMITS, supra note 49, at 35.
107 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
1o8 See LIMITS, supra note 49, at 20-22, for an overview of the history of
abortion legislation.
109 See id. at 19 (discussing the historical exception in the abortion statutes);
see also Eugene Quay, Justifiable Abortion - Medical & Legal Foundations, 49 GEO.
L.J. 395, 437 (1961) (noting that protecting the life of the mother was exempted from
many abortion laws).
''o See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 140 n.37 (1973) (listing the Alaska,
Hawaii, New York, and Washington statutes repealing criminal penalties for
abortions performed in early pregnancy by a licensed physician).
.. Id. (listing the fourteen state statutes modeled after the Model Penal Code
at the time Roe was decided).
112 MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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abortion was legal to save the mother's life or her physical or mental
health, or if there was strong reason to believe the baby would be born
with a significant physical or mental defect, or if the pregnancy had
resulted from rape or incest. In addition, Alabama" 13 and the District
of Columbia" 4 had long allowed abortions to preserve the mother's
health as well as her life.
Roe v. Wade invalidated Texas's traditional anti-abortion law," 5
and Doe v. Bolton invalidated Georgia's modem Model Penal Code-
type law."16  By now everybody knows the outline of the Roe
decision, which was by far the more important of the two. The
Supreme Court held that the liberty that is protected from deprivation
without due process of law by the fourteenth amendment includes a
right of privacy; that right is "broad enough" to encompass a woman's
decision whether to terminate her pregnancy; it is a fundamental right,
which can only be overridden to the extent necessary to serve a
compelling state interest. In the abortion context, the state's interest
in maternal health is compelling from the end of the first trimester of
pregnancy; its interest in the potential life of the fetus is compelling
from the time the fetus becomes viable. Accordingly, the state may
regulate abortion to the extent necessary to protect maternal health
from the end of the first trimester on, and it may regulate or even
prohibit abortion to preserve fetal life from the time of fetal viability
as long as it continues to permit abortions to save the mother's life or
health.' "'
One might have thought that some notion of autonomy underlay
the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade. But the Court was
careful to reject the claim that a woman has a right to do whatever she
wants with her body," 8 and the Court explicitly approved state
regulation of abortion to protect the mother's health after the end of
the first trimester.' 9 Indeed, the Court also allowed the states to
prohibit anyone other than a licensed physician from performing an
abortion even during the first trimester. 20 Thus, from the outset of its
113 ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 9 (1958).
114 D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-101 (2001).
115 Roe at 118 n. 1 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1191-1194, 1196
(Vernon 1960)).
116 Doe, 410 U.S. at 202 (Appendix A citing GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202(b))
'7 The majority provides a comprehensive recap of the Roe framework at the
end of the opinion, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
".. Roe, 410U.S. at 154.
'' Id. at 163.
120 Id. The Court uses the example of a state requiring a licensed physician to
perform abortions to illustrate the sorts of regulations that would be permissible to
protect the health of the mother.
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abortion jurisprudence the Supreme Court rejected autonomy as the
value at stake and adopted rules that are inconsistent with the pursuit
of autonomy.
That remains the case to this day. In 1989 when the Court came
close to overruling Roe v. Wade in Webster v. Reproductive
Services,12' Roe's author Justice Blackmun filed an anguished
dissent. 22 There he (belatedly) stated an autonomy rationale for the
abortion right: "it is this general principle, the 'moral fact that a
person belongs to himself and not others nor to society as a whole'...
that is found in the Constitution."'' 23 Yet immediately after making
this pronouncement, Justice Blackmun reaffirmed his support for
regulating abortion after the first trimester to protect maternal
health, 24 regulation that is inconsistent with maternal autonomy.
By 1992 the Supreme Court seemed to be ready to adopt an
autonomy rationale for a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy.
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,' 25 the Court was badly split. Three
justices, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, issued a joint opinion in
which they reaffirmed what they characterized the central holding of
Roe.126 According to them this so-called "central holding" has three
parts: (I) There is a right to abortion before viability without undue
interference by the state; (2) the state may restrict abortions after
viability as long as there are exceptions for abortions that threaten the
mother's life or health; and (3) the state has a legitimate interest from
the outset of pregnancy in the health of the mother and the life of the
fetus. 127
Among the reasons for reaffirming this "central holding" were the
three justice's view that "the right to define one's concept of the
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life"' 28 is "[a]t the heart of [the concept of] liberty"' 129 and their
opinion that the unique and intimate suffering undergone by women in
pregnancy and childbirth requires that a woman's destiny be shaped
by "her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in
12 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
122 Id. at 537 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
123 Id. at 549 (quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetrics and
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 777 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
124 See id. (stating that regulation after the first trimester is acceptable because
a state has a legitimate interest in protecting a pregnant woman's health).
125 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
126 Id. at 845-46.
127 Id. at 846.
121 Id. at 851.
129 Id.
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society."'' 30  These views were supported by cases which supported
intimate relationships and decisions and by cases protecting personal
autonomy and bodily integrity.' 3' In separate opinions, Justices
Blackmun and Stevens also emphasized bodily integrity 132 and the
freedom to make important personal decisions.' 33 Thus, a majority of
the Justices in Casey seemed to root the abortion right at least partly
in autonomy, both in the liberal individualism sense and in the
physical essentialism sense.
Nonetheless, the Court's apparent commitment to autonomy
remains rhetorical, not real. The Court still permits abortion
regulation to protect the health of the mother, 34 a concession that is
totally inconsistent with the pursuit of autonomy as the goal.
Moreover, the Court in some ways increased the states' ability to
regulate abortion, thus restricting women's autonomy even more than
earlier cases had. The Court recognized that the states' interest in
maternal health and fetal life exist from the outset of pregnancy,' 35
and that some restrictions to serve those interests are therefore
permissible before the end of the first trimester (maternal health) 36
130 Id. at 852.
' Id. at 846-50, 852 (giving the historical background behind the right of a
woman to terminate a pregnancy and the court's rationale behind that right); Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (holding that personal decision of an
individual to use contraceptives are afforded Constitutional protection). See also
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (stating that "[i]f the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual ... to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (holding that the Constitution does not permit a state to forbid a married
couple to use contraceptives).
132 Casey. 505 U.S. at 915. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("In counterpoise [to the State's interest in potential human life] is the woman's
constitutional interest in liberty. One aspect of this right is a right to bodily integrity,
a right to control one's person") (citations omitted); Id. at 926-27 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (".... restrictive abortion laws force women
to endure physical invasions for more substantial than those this Court has held to
violate the [Clonstitutional principle of bodily integrity in other contexts") (citations
omitted).
133 Id. at 915 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The
woman's constitutional liberty interest also involves her freedom to decide matters of
the highest privacy and the most personal nature")(citations omitted); Id. at 927-28
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[Wihen the State restricts a
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy, it deprives a woman of the right to make
her own decision about reproduction and family planning - critical life choices that
this Court long has deemed central to the right to privacy").
14 Id. at 878.
' Id. at 846.
136 Id. at 875-76 (recognizing a state's interest in protecting the health and life
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and before fetal viability (potential life of the fetus). 137 The authors of
the joint opinion also weaken the woman's right. If their view
prevails, the abortion right is no longer a fundamental right that can
only be restricted to the extent necessary to a compelling state interest.
Now the right must simply not be unduly burdened. 38 It is not even
clear from the joint opinion whether the strength of the state's interest
is relevant to determining whether a burden on the abortion right is
undue.' 39 Finally, at the practical level, the Court upheld one new
restriction on the abortion right, a twenty-four hour waiting period
(unless the wait would endanger the woman's life or health) 40 that
specifically handicaps a woman's opportunity to make a decision and
act on it, i.e., her autonomy.
Thus, the Supreme Court's abortion decisions, far from
representing the triumph of autonomy, demonstrate how far from
wholehearted the commitment to autonomy is and how deep the
concern for other values remains. Some concern for autonomy is
present, although how important it is as opposed to the more practical
concern of enabling women to lead lives freed from the adverse
consequences of unwanted pregnancy and motherhood,' 41 is unclear.
of a pregnant woman); id. at 872 ("[t]hough the woman has a right to choose to
terminate or continue her pregnancy before viability, it does not at all follow that the
State is prohibited from taking steps to ensure that this choice is thoughtful and
informed").
' E.g., id. at 873, 876.
138 Id. at 874 ("[o]nly where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a
woman's ability to make [the decision whether to have an abortion] does the power of
the state reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause")
(citations omitted); Id. at 876 ("[i]n our view, the undue burden standard is the
appropriate means of reconciling the State's interest with the woman's
constitutionally protected liberty").
139 Casey does not talk about comparing the woman's interests to those of the
state, but simply defines undue burdens as "substantial obstacle[s]." Id. at 877
(opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.)
141 Id. at 885-86.
141 There is some discussion in Roe about the potential psychological and
subsequent physical consequences of an unwanted pregnancy. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
Blackmun's majority opinion merely disagrees that these consequences of unwanted
pregnancy should make the abortion right absolute; instead, Blackmun cites the state
interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in potential life
as justifying state regulation at some point. Id. Blackmun also questions whether the
"unlimited" right asserted by some amici to do with one's body as one pleases has
much relationship to the privacy right. Id. There is no statement of how much, or
where, the concern for a woman's physical and psychological autonomy factors into
the right to have an abortion, but what is clear is that if the state can regulate the
abortion decision at any point, autonomy is not the overriding principle. Likewise,
Justice O'Connor in Casey notes the grave consequences for mother, society, and
child of unwanted pregnancy, and indeed defines the constitutional issue before the
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Yet other values are present and served too. Of course, the Court
recognizes and grapples with the value of the potential life of the
fetus. 142 It also continues to support the value of good medical care
even when that value interferes with patient autonomy.
43
I have argued elsewhere that the profound value conflict in the
area of abortion is one reason that the abortion issue is unsuitable for
constitutional response.' 44 Regardless of whether one accepts that
argument, however, it is plain that the Supreme Court recognizes, as
everyone must, that multiple values are at stake in the abortion
controversy. One value cannot be allowed to triumph because the loss
of other matters of great importance would be too great to accept.
Autonomy is important in deciding about abortion, but it is not all
there is. It would be bizarre if the Supreme Court or any other
sensible legal body acted as if it were.
The same thing may be said about death facilitation, although the
reasons to consider more than autonomy there are less clear than in
abortion because of the absence of any equivalent of a fetus in the
death facilitation cases.
Before 1976 the law, at least in theory, prohibited all forms of
death facilitation - withholding and withdrawing life support as well
as assisted suicide and euthanasia. 145 This was, of course, inconsistent
with patient autonomy, and increasingly the prohibition has been
challenged. In truth the prohibition was never as absolute as it
appeared, and the move toward autonomy is not as successful either as
it appears or as some would like. Once again too many values are at
Court in terms of a woman's liberty. Casey, 505 U.S. at 850, 852. Yet Casey, citing,
among other things, Roe's expressed state interest in protecting potential life, permits
state regulation. Id. at 873-76. Essentially, what trumps the woman's autonomy
interest is the autonomy interests of a potential life that, while perhaps capable of
living outside of the woman, does not. Id. at 870-77.
142 E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,725-26; Casey, 505 U.S. at 870-71.
143 For instance, Roe cites as examples of permissible regulations after the
first trimester the qualifications of those who may perform an abortion, the licensure
of those persons, and in what sort of facility abortions may be performed. Roe at 163.
144 See LIMITS, supra note 49, at 52 (discussing the problems with a
constitutional response to abortion).
145 Terminological confusion about various forms of death facilitation is
common. All forms of death facilitation could be called euthanasia, which simply
means good death. I use the term, "euthanasia," however, only to refer to the well
motivated affirmative act (commission) of a person other than the patient of killing
the patient by some means other than simply removing life support. Assisted suicide
means the act of a patient killing himself after another person has provided him with
the means to do so. Withholding or withdrawing life support means just what it says.
Death facilitation refers to all forms - euthanasia, assisted suicide, and withholding
and withdrawing life support.
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stake to allow one value (either autonomy or the pre-1976
commitment to the value of life) to prevail.
Before 1976 all forms of death facilitating behavior were crimes,
often first degree murder. 46  Yet no health professional was ever
convicted (and hardly any were ever prosecuted) for any form of
death facilitating behavior 47 despite the fact that both empirical and
anecdotal evidence demonstrate that death facilitating behavior by
physicians was common. 48 The pre-1976 situation was an example
of one form of legal compromise. Extreme law that ignored one set of
values was on the books, but the law in action and the human beings
who run the system respected other values as well and reduced the
threat of the written law to almost nothing. Undoubtedly there was
less death facilitation than some persons preferred, as a theoretical
threat combined with most physicians' view of themselves as law
abiding persons to prevent many acts of death facilitation. But there
was more death facilitation than the written law or its supporters
would have preferred. How close the compromise came to ideal in
terms of the number of instances of death facilitation and the
appropriateness of individual decisions one cannot say, but it is likely
that it came closer than serous enforcement of the written law or free
access to withholding and withdrawing medical care, assisted suicide,
and euthanasia would come.
Serious reform began in 1976 with the famous case of Karen Ann
Quinlan. 149 There a previously healthy young woman slipped into a
coma from which she had no chance to emerge. Her father sought to
be appointed her guardian for the purpose of having the respirator that
kept Ms. Quinlan alive removed. The New Jersey Supreme Court
decided that the principle that allows a woman to decide to terminate
her pregnancy under some circumstances is broad enough to allow a
person to decide to reject life-sustaining medical care in some
146 See LIMITS, supra note 49, at 112 (citing the definition of first degree
murder in WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 7.7, at 642-
43 (2d ed. 1986)); Donald G. Collester, Jr. Death, Dying, & the Law: A Prosecutorial
View of the Quinlan Case, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 304, 309 (1977) (explaining that
motive irrelevant if the intent and act of ending another's life are present). See also In
re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 669-70 (N.J. 1976) (determining that a death resulting from
withdrawal of life sustaining procedures is not homicide, but rather allowing death
from natural causes).
147 LIMITS, supra note 49, at 113.
148 See id. (citing Leonard H. Glantz, Withholding and Withdrawing
Treatment: The Role of the Criminal Law, 15 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 231, 232
(1987/88)).
149 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976) cert. denied sub nom. Garger v.
New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
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instances. 50  Therefore, it decided that if Ms. Quinlan were
competent, she could choose to have life support terminated.' 5 ' The
court then held that an incompetent person has the same right with
regard to withdrawal of life support as a competent person,'52 and it
adopted procedures and a substantive standard for allowing the
incompetent Ms. Quinlan's right to be exercised on her behalf.'53
Later cases throughout the United States have similarly
recognized a right to have life support withheld or withdrawn and
have taken the position that both competent and incompetent persons
have that right. 54  Courts have differed about the procedure for
implementing the right for incompetent persons,' 55 and about the
substantive standard to be applied when deciding whether to do so.
56
5o Id. at 663.
's' Id. at 663-64.
152 Id. at 664.
I5 ld. at 671.
114 E.g., Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 417 (authorizing an incompetent cancer
patient's guardian to refuse chemotherapy on the patient's behalf); In re Spring, 405
N.E.2d 115, 117-18 (Mass. 1980) (authorizing wife and son of a disoriented end-stage
renal disease patient to terminate life-saving dialysis treatments for the patient,
despite the fact that the patient had never expressed any desire to die or have
treatment discontinued). See also In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla.
1990) (holding that an incompetent patient in persistent vegetative state may be taken
off life-sentencing treatment pursuant to guardian's request and as indicated by
patient's living will); Mitchell ex rel. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 686
(Ariz. 1987).
155 Compare, e.g., Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 435 (requiring that decisions
whether to withhold or withdraw life support be submitted to the probate court for
adjudication) and In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d at 120-21 (Mass. 1980) ("clarifying"
Saikewicz by setting out factors for determining whether a hearing is necessary) with
a string of New Jersey cases declaring different procedures for different scenarios,
including In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985) (adopting procedures for removal
or withholding of life support from elderly, once-competent, nursing home patients
with about one year to live); In re Peter 529 A.2d 419, 425, 429 (N.J. 1987) (holding
that for patient's in a "persistent vegetative state" whose wishes are unclear, a
guardian can refuse life-sustaining treatment for the patient only after certain
safeguards have been met); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987) (adopting a
different set of procedures for incompetent, non-elderly patients who are not in a
nursing home).
156 Two major competing standards have been offered for deciding whether to
withhold or withdraw life support. First is an objective standard that attempts to
determine the best interests of the patient. The second, and more subjective standard,
is a substituted-judgment approach, under which a substitute decision-maker is
supposed to make the same decision for the incompetent patient that the patient would
make for himself. For a more complete discussion of the two standards, see LIMITS,
supra note 49, at 118-21. See also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)
(holding prohibitions against assisted suicide do not offend the Constitution); Vacco
v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (noting the differences between the right of competent
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Every state legislature has enacted one or more statutes to permit
terminally ill persons to have life support withheld or withdrawn.1
57
However, only Oregon has gone farther and authorized physician
assisted suicide in some circumstances, 58 and no state allows
euthanasia.
The United States Supreme Court has considered death
facilitation twice. In 1990 the Court decided Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health.5 9 In that case the parents of a young
woman in a persistent vegetative state sought permission to end the
artificial feedings that were keeping their daughter alive. The
Missouri Supreme Court had denied that permission, holding that life
support could only be withdrawn from a previously competent patient
if there was clear and convincing evidence that the patient would have
wanted the support withdrawn, and holding that the evidence in Ms.
Cruzan's case was not clear and convincing. 160  The United States
Supreme Court affirmed.
The Court stated that its prior decisions supported an inference
that competent persons have a constitutionally protected interest in
refusing treatment. 61 The Court then assumed (because given their
decision it made no difference) that the Constitution grants competent
persons the right to reject nutrition and hydration. 62 Even if it does,
however, the state has two interests that may override the right - the
interest in preserving life163 and the interest in safeguarding the
personal element of choice. 164 The Court held that the clear and
convincing evidence standard serves both ends when it is applied to
the case of a person who, at the time of decision making, is
incompetent to make her own choice.
65
More recently in Washington v. Glucksberg 66 and Vacco v.
Quill, 167 decided on the same day, the Supreme Court has considered
persons to refuse life sustaining treatment and that of assisted suicide); Saikewicz, 370
N.E.2d at 431 (explaining "substituted judgment" as a commendable standard).
157 See LIMITS, supra note 49, at 126-31 (discussing the variety of legislative
approaches to the right-to-die issue).
'58 The Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-127.897
(2000).
159 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
160 Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988).
161 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.
162 Id. at 279.
163 Id. at 280.
164 Id. at 281-83.
165 Id. at 282.
166 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
167 Vacco, 521 U.S. at 793.
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whether the Constitution includes a right to commit suicide and to
assistance in doing so. The Court held that it does not. In reaching
this conclusion the Court explicitly rejected the claim that the
Constitution protects a general right of personal autonomy. 68 Indeed,
the Court refused to root its decision in any principle at all. Instead, it
simply distinguished assisted suicide from withholding and
withdrawing care, by treating the withholding and withdrawing cases
as involving rejecting or refusing to consent to medical care, and
noting that as a matter of history and tradition the United States has
long accepted the idea that a person has a right to decide whether to
consent to medical care, but has not accepted a right to assisted
suicide. 169 The Court also made plain its intent to reject any claim
that the Constitution protects a right to euthanasia by saying that one
reason not to permit assisted suicide was to avoid starting down the
path to euthanasia.170 Thus, in the death and dying area, as elsewhere,
it is plain that patient autonomy is not the primary value being served
by American medical law no matter how many autonomy statements
one can find in the cases and no matter how many bioethicists would
like to believe that it is.
C. The Trouble with Autonomy
Patient autonomy is the dominant rhetorical, but not the dominant
real value being served by American medical law. The largely
rhetorical triumph of autonomy leaves the law in a very unattractive
condition in which patients' needs are often ignored, patients are
susceptible to abuse, and important needs of other persons are either
ignored or are recognized in a sporadic, arbitrary fashion.
II. IGNORING PATIENTS' NEEDS
Patients consult doctors and other health professionals because
they need or want their professional expertise. Unless a patient is a
physician, the patient's doctor will know more about diagnosing and
treating the patient's condition than the patient will. Moreover, even
if the patient is a physician, the doctor will be better able to evaluate
the patient's condition than the patient will because the doctor will not
be emotionally involved. It is the patient, not the doctor who is
168 Washington, 521 U.S. at 723-28.
169 See Vacco, 521 U.S. at 800-07 (discussing the distinction between refusing
medical treatment and assisted suicide).
170 Washington, 521 U.S. at 723-28; Vacco, 521 U.S. at 809 (noting that by




frightened and/or suffering. Medical care can and should be
committed and compassionate, but in order to provide the best (i.e.,
most likely to be successful) treatment for the patient, it must also be
dispassionate in order to maximize the likelihood of clear thinking and
minimize mistakes born of fear, pain, or other distress. Patients need
dispassionate experts to deal with their medical conditions. If doctors
do not serve that function, who will?
The doctor is not, however, an expert in non-medical matters.
The goal of the system should be to enable patients to get maximum
medical professional benefit from their doctors without being
burdened by the doctor's non-expert preferences.
The focus on patient autonomy prevents patients from getting
maximum medical professional benefit from their physicians.
Perhaps that would not be the case if autonomy were properly
understood, but as the concept has been translated from philosophy to
law and from law to the workaday understanding of physicians, it has
become a device for depriving patients of some of the benefits they
pay professionals for.
In law autonomy means either liberal individualism or physical
essentialism.' 7 ' Liberal individualism in this context means the right
of a patient to make his own decisions about important personal
matters and to effectuate those decisions (or have them effectuated).
Properly understood this would mean that the patient is entitled to all
the information relevant to the decision, including information the
patient does not know he wants or needs. To exercise autonomy the
patient would have to be fully informed and counseled about what
decision to make. Mill himself recognized and explicitly argued that
freedom to make choices does not mean that one should act in a
vacuum. 72 Other persons should remonstrate with a person, argue
with him, and attempt to get him to do the right thing. Being
autonomous does not mean being let alone.
In practice, of course, it is not possible to give a patient all
information. The law of informed consent instead requires that the
patient be given either all material information 73 or whatever
171 Medical Law and Ethics, supra note 10, at 733-36.
172 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 91-3 (Currin V. Shields ed., The
Liberal Arts Press, Inc. 1956) (1859) (discussing the concept that while individuals
should have freedom to make choices, they must also accept the consequences).
173 E.g., Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598 (Cal. 1993) (holding a physician has
a duty to disclose all rational information to a patient); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 1I
(Cal. 1972) (stating that doctors must provide all material information); Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786-87 (D.C. Circ. 1972) (describing the standard as objective
in helping the patient be informed and allowing the physician to make the judgment
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information a reasonable doctor would provide. 7 4 Thus, the standard
of information disclosure does not foster patient autonomy for
perfectly understandable practical reasons. Yet doctors are taught by
ethicists that autonomy is the dominant value, and they see that failure
to do what the law requires can lead to liability. Therefore, they do
two things: First they treat informed consent as a legal hurdle to be
leaped rather than an opportunity to communicate with their patients.
This is reflected in the use of the word, "consent" as a transitive verb:
"Who is going to consent the patient?" Whoever "consents" the
patient will not be practicing the furtherance of patient autonomy.
75
Second doctors refuse to remonstrate with their patients. Patients are
free to do whatever they want. Moreover, doctors have been taught
that only the patient knows his own condition, what is important to
him, etc. Therefore, they abandon their patients to make the most
awesome choices guided by fear, misunderstanding, and whatever
anecdotes the patient has heard from his Uncle Fred or the health
segment on the local 11:00 news. This is autonomy?
Autonomy becomes almost a caricature of itself in the field of
genetic counseling. 76  There, autonomy leads to the practice of
nondirective counseling, telling patients the facts and explaining their
options, but doing no counseling at all, steadfastly refusing in the
name of ethics to give the patient any advice or even the
professional's own opinion.177  I have discussed elsewhere the
impossibility of genetic counseling being truly nondirective and my
observation that, like autonomy in general, nondirectiveness is often
of what amount of information would allow for informed consent).
174 E.g., Hook v. Rothstein, 316 S.E.2d 690 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied
320 S.E.2d 35 (S.C. 1984) (adopting the professional standard when dealing with the
duty on the part of the physician to inform the patient of inherent risks of the
proposed medical procedure).
175 See Morris, supra note 7, at 315, referring to the right to patient self-
determination as "empty rhetoric," quoting Alexander Capron describing informed
consent as "a charade, a symbolic but contentless formality." Id. at 316 (quoting
Alexander Morgan Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and
Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340, 367 (1974-75), and citing other authors to the
same effect, Morris at 316, note 16.
176 See The Human Genome Project, supra note 5, at 118-19 (explaining that
because genetic health questions affect more than just the "target" person, true
autonomy is not practical); see generally DAVID H. SMITH ET AL., EARLY WARNING:
CASES AND ETHICAL GUIDANCE FOR PRESYMPTOMATIC TESTING IN GENETIC DISEASES
(1998) [hereinafter EARLY WARNING]; CHARLES L. BOSK, ALL GOD'S MISTAKES:
GENETIC COUNSELING IN A PEDIATRIC HOSPITAL (1992).
177 See LIMITS, supra note 49, at 98-99 (discussing the difficult position in
which genetic counselors are placed, with little assistance from the law).
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honored in the breach. 78 However, to the extent that professionals do
practice or try to practice nondirective counseling they deprive their
patients of the very thing the patients came to them for - their
professional expertise.
While liberal individualism seems to be the dominant
understanding of autonomy in medicine, some judges also talk in
physical essentialist terms. Physical essentialism means that one's
body is the essence of oneself. Autonomy means having one's body
let alone. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey the joint opinion and the
opinions of Justice Stevens and of Justice Blackmun all spoke of the
importance of private control of one's body as well as the importance
of freedom to make important, intimate decisions for oneself. 79 This
is a bit confusing because it makes it difficult to perceive exactly what
notion of autonomy these five justices are applying. In truth, they
must be applying liberal individualism. After all, abortion of a
competent woman is not about protecting her from having someone
invade her body. It is about her freedom to choose to have someone
make just such an invasion.
Moreover, if a patient is competent, physical essentialism either
makes no sense or it is inextricably tied to liberal individualism. Only
if a patient is incompetent, can physical essentialism be a value apart
from liberal individualism. In those cases it is a value whose pursuit
may or may not help the patient.
If a patient is competent, it is senseless to say that there is an
independent value of bodily integrity (physical essentialism) apart
from freedom of choice (liberal individualism). If there were, it
would mean that a patient could not choose to have his bodily
integrity invaded, for example, by undergoing surgery, even for his
own good.' 80 Therefore, in cases involving competent patients talk
about bodily integrity reduces to a concern for freedom of choice. A
doctor may not invade a patient's body without the patient's consent.
Of course, to be meaningful consent has to be voluntary and informed.
Therefore, we are back to serving the value of free choice with all the
problems discussed above.
178 The Human Genome Project, supra note 5, at 118-19.
179 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-51, 915, 926-28 (1992).
See supra notes 132-33 for quotations.
180 In extreme cases physical essentialism may be relevant apart from liberal
individualism. For example, if the law were to prohibit self mutilation or plastic
surgery, that would protect the body from even the freely choosing patient. In that
case physical essentialism autonomy would be purchased at the cost of liberal
individualism autonomy.
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If a patient is incompetent, however, bodily integrity may be an
important value to consider and may be a more realistic focus of
concern for autonomy than liberal individualism. However, serving
the value may actually harm the patient. A wonderful example of the
conflict between liberal individualism and physical essentialism
involving an incompetent patient is the case of Conservatorship of
Valerie N. 8'
Valerie N. was a mentally incompetent young California woman
who was sexually aggressive toward men. Her parents, acting on
medical advice, sought to have her sterilized, but they were stymied
because a California statute prohibited sterilizing mentally
incompetent persons.'82 The parents challenged the constitutionality
of the statute. The California Supreme Court held the statute
unconstitutional. The majority applied liberal individualist reasoning
in this case of an incompetent patient, where such reasoning makes
little sense. Recognizing that Valerie could not choose for herself
whether to be sterilized, the majority considered the issue to be
whether Valerie had a constitutional right to have someone else make
the decision for her.183 They concluded that she did in order to serve
her important interest in developing to her fullest potential.' 84 At a
level of practicality (i.e., not theory or constitutional law) this seems
right. As long as sufficient safeguards are in place to assure that only
persons who will truly benefit from sterilization are sterilized,
sterilization makes sense. For a person like Valerie it maximizes her
chance to live outside of an institution, to perform a job within her
capabilities, to enjoy sexual relations, and to go about life generally
unsupervised. None of this has anything to do with her freedom to
choose to be sterilized. It simply shows the court's respect for Valerie
as a human being by doing what is best for her in all ways, including
maximizing her opportunity to exercise as much autonomy as she is
capable of exercising.
Chief Justice Bird dissented. 85 She thought it made no sense to
focus on choice in a case about a person who could not choose 86 and
in a case about whether to remove that person's ability to conceive,
noting that unlike terminating a pregnancy, conceiving need not
involve a choice.' 87 Chief Justice Bird focused instead on the right to
181 707 P.2d 760 (Cal. 1985).
182 CAL. PROB. CODE § 2356(d) (West 2002).
113 Valerie N.. 707 P.2d at 771.
114 Id. at 772.
185 Id. at 781.
186 Id. at 788.
187 Id. at 784-85.
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procreate,1 88 a right, she said, unrelated to choice. 189 Procreation is a
"primal" right, 90 part of the "constitution"' 9' of a human being.
While the state has important interests in protecting Valerie's well-
being, the state had not shown that protecting those interests required
Valerie's sterilization. 92 Therefore, it could not allow her to be
deprived of her right to procreate, 193 a right that is, if you will, part of
her physical essence.
At the level of analysis Chief Justice Bird's approach has much to
recommend it. It avoids the necessity of fiction and dealing with a
case about a person who cannot make the choice involved as if she
could. In practical terms, however, Bird's opinion is cruel. She
would deny Valerie sterilization, thus dooming her to a life of
supervision and restriction, much of it directed at assuring that Valerie
would never be able to exercise the primal right that Chief Justice
Bird would preserve for her.
What Valerie N. demonstrates is the inadequacy of a
jurisprudence based on autonomy. The majority does the right thing
for Valerie by torturing the concept of liberal individualism and
resorting to fiction. The dissent avoids fiction and silliness and
sacrifices Valerie's well-being for Chief Justice Bird's ideals. How
much better it would have been to simply ask what Valerie's
condition was and what would be best for her, and then to do it.
Alternatively, one might simply have yielded to the will of the
legislature. Neither approach would have required discussion of free
choice or the primal physical ability to procreate.
Autonomy, thus often ignores patients needs. This may suggest
that the hard won defeat of medical paternalism is a Pyhrric victory.
II. ABUSING PATIENTS
The victory may be Pyhrric in more ways than one. A
commitment to the rhetoric of autonomy not only ignores patient
needs, it also provides a convenient opportunity to abuse incompetent
patients in the name of doing what they would have chosen to have
done for themselves.
188 Id. at 784, citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942)
(recognizing the "right to have offspring").
8 Id. at 785.
190 Id.
1 ' Id. at 786.
192 Id. at 787.
'9' Id. at 787-88.
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Of course, it need not be this way. One could simply say that
autonomy means freedom of choice, and that it is inapplicable in cases
involving persons who lack the ability to freely choose. Courts have
been reluctant to do that, however. Autonomy has taken on such a
mythic force that courts often try to apply it to cases in which patient
autonomy cannot scientifically exist, as the majority did in Valerie N.
This tendency is exacerbated by an unthinking commitment to
equality. In every case about whether to facilitate the death of an
incompetent person decided before Cruzan, courts decided what the
rights of a competent person would be and then said that the rights of
incompetent persons must be the same as the rights of competent
persons in order to avoid demeaning incompetent persons. 194 Thus, if
competent persons are allowed autonomously to choose to have their
deaths facilitated, incompetent persons must have the same right. Not
only does this make no sense, perversely it also demeans persons with
disabilities. For a person with a major disability, the disability may be
the defining feature of his or her life. For those who care about
individualism, the disability may be the most individual thing about
the person. To insist that the person be treated like a person without a
disability is to force the person to be accommodated to the majority's
status, ignoring individualism in the name of forced conformity. To
do that in the name of autonomy is ironic indeed.
The irony can have practical and devastating consequences. Take
the case of Earl Spring. 95 Mr. Spring was a formerly competent
elderly man who had never expressed an opinion about whether there
were circumstances in which he would prefer to die than to continue
to live. Mr. Spring had a wife of many years standing and an adult
son. He also had two serious medical conditions, renal failure and
chronic organic brain syndrome. The renal failure required Mr.
Spring to receive hemodialysis three times a week at a dialysis center
far from his home. Without the dialysis he would die. His wife
transported him to the dialysis center and back. Mr. Spring's chronic
organic brain syndrome made him difficult to be around. He cursed at
and kicked his nurses, pulled out his dialysis tubing, and was
generally unpleasant. Mrs. Spring suffered a stoke, which her son
attributed to the strain of caring for her husband.
Mrs. Spring and her son petitioned a Massachusetts court for
permission to stop Mr. Spring's dialysis treatments. They stated that
Mr. Spring had been a vigorous man who surely would not want to
194 See, e.g., supra notes 152, 154; see generally LIMITS, supra note 49, at
114-46 (discussing judicial reform of the right to die).
195 In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1980).
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live as he was.' 96 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
reaffirmed a competent person's right to choose to have life
prolonging treatment withdrawn. 97  It then applied a substituted
judgment test to decide that Mr. Spring himself would choose to die if
he could. 198 Therefore, in order to foster Mr. Spring's autonomy, the
court authorized the wife and son to stop the dialysis treatments. 99
To put it simply, the court allowed a man who was unpleasant and a
nuisance to be killed, and it did so in the name of serving his
autonomy. It is a lot more comfortable to believe one is doing
something noble, like respecting another person's autonomy, than to
confront the stark question of whether old, annoying, dependent
people should be killed. That comfort is horribly dangerous. No
court would say that it is acceptable to kill the old, annoying, and
dependent. We must not let courts achieve the same result in the
name of patient autonomy.
IV. THE NEEDS OF OTHERS
The underlying premise of the autonomy focus is that one person
is primarily affected by medical decisions, that it is possible to
identify that person, and that his or her interests are so much more
important than anybody (or everybody) else's that they must dominate
completely, so that consideration of other person's interests is
illegitimate. The dominant person is the patient. In the words of a
popular play and television drama, "Whose Life Is It Anyway?
200
When other people's interests are considered, they are either
considered surreptitiously as Mrs. Spring's interests apparently
were, 20 1 or they are considered as possible candidates for creating an
exception to the focus on the patient.20 2
In fact, while it is often easy to identify who the patient or the
most affected person is, that is not always the case. Two obvious
196 Yale Kamisar once noted in my presence that almost everybody was once
vigorous. The wife's and son's argument if taken seriously would provide a basis for
"allowing" almost everyone who has become incompetent to die.
117 405 N.E.2d at 119.
"9 Id. at 122-23.
199 Id.
200 BRIAN CLARK, WHOSE LIFE IS IT ANYWAY? (Dodd, Mead & Company
1978) (1972).
201 See 405 N.E.2d at 122 n. 3 (noting that the wife's opinion may have been
compromised by financial considerations, but excusing it by implying that the
patient's own opinion, if he were competent, might also have been skewed by
financial considerations).
202 E.g., Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 424-27 (discussing State and third-party
interests that may trigger the exception to patient focus).
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contexts in which it is difficult to identify the most affected person are
genetic medicine and vaccinations for some communicable diseases.
Genetic medicine is family medicine. The raison d'etre for most
forms of genetic medical practice is to enable members of families to
deal with diseases that run in families. When a married couple seeks
genetic counseling to learn the carrier status of either the husband or
the wife; or when that couple seeks prenatal diagnosis of their fetus;
or when parents seek a diagnosis of their child's genetic condition,
who is the patient? Whose autonomy is to be respected? If the couple
is concerned about the possibility of transmitting an autosomal
recessive disease, then each member of the couple needs to know the
carrier status of both. Otherwise, neither will be able to make
intelligent reproductive decisions. If the question is whether the
husband is a carrier of the mutation for an autosomal dominant
disease, the wife cannot make an informed decision about whether to
conceive or bear a child unless she knows her husband's genetic
condition. If prenatal diagnosis is involved, the genetic status of the
wife, the husband, and the fetus are all relevant. The wife's status is
important because she is pregnant and because she may learn about
her own genetic condition from the diagnosis of the fetus. The
husband's condition is relevant because he may learn about his
condition from diagnosis of the fetus and because as father of the fetus
he has some stake in the outcome of the pregnancy. The fetus itself
obviously is important, especially if it is past the age of viability so
that its interests enjoy some legal protection. If parents bring their
child for diagnosis or treatment, all the usual ambiguities that attend
the doctor-patient relationship when the patient is a child are
exacerbated by the fact that the child's diagnosis reveals information
about the parents.
Similarly, it is sometimes difficult to know who the person most
affected by a vaccination decision is. For example, rubella is a benign
disease with symptoms similar to those of a common cold. However,
if a pregnant woman contracts rubella, its effects on her fetus will be
devastating. Who is the person most affected by decisions - including
governmental decisions about mandatory vaccination programs -
about whether to vaccinate little boys for rubella? If the focus were
on the little boy's well-being or his parents' autonomy, vaccination
would seem a poor idea. It costs something, exposes the child to a
very small risk (as every needle puncture does), and gives him an
unwanted needle stick all to avoid the possibility of getting something
like a cold. Obviously, few little boys or their parents would make
this choice. If however, the primary "person" involved is the unborn
child of the little boy's mother, baby sitter, school teacher, or day care
worker, the calculus looks very different. We vaccinate boys against
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rubella because we know that just asking whose body is involved is
too simplistic a way to make health care decisions.
Even when it is possible to identify the person who is most
involved in a medical decision, that does not mean that person is the
only person involved. It does not follow from one person's primary
involvement, that other involved persons are to be ignored. Examples
abound.
Family members and other persons who may come into contact
with a person with a communicable disease obviously have interests
worth considering as old quarantine laws 20 3 and modern decisions
about duties to war204 recognize. Many family members and
potential family members have interests in learning about genetic
diseases in the family. For example, a person whose parent,
grandparent, sibling, or more distant relative has familial adenomatous
polyposis of the colon (FAP), a dominant disease that causes some
cases of colon cancer, has a strong interest in learning that the disease
runs in the family.20 5  Persons who know they are at risk can be
203 E.g., GEN. LAWS OF CAL., ACT 6238, §§ 12-17 (Deering 1937);
CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF N.Y. ANN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW §§ 101-145 (Birdseye,
Cumming, & Gilbert 1918).
204 See Michelle R. King, Physician Duty to Warn a Patient's Qffspring of
Hereditary Genetic Defects: Balancing the Patient's Right to Confidentiality Against
the Family Member's Right to Know - Can or Should Tarasoff Apply, 4 QUINNIPIAC
HEALTH L.J. I, 14-15 (2000-01) (applying the duty to warn to contagious diseases in
recent court decisions) (citing Bolieu v. Sisters of Providence, 953 P.2d 1233, 1241
(Alaska 1998) as holding "health care facility owed a duty to spouses of nursing
assistants to warn them of the risks of exposure to staph infection"); DiMarco v.
Lynch Homes-Chester County, Inc., 583 A.2d 422, 424 (Pa. 1990) (finding a duty to
warn anyone who may be physically intimate with a patient who had hepatitis B)).
Debate still rages in courts about the duty to warn when there is a risk of HIV
transmission. Compare Reisner v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 37 Cal Rptr. 2d 518
(1995) (holding that a duty to warn considers the foreseeability of the potential
victim, not simply whether the victim is "readily identifiable", but physician's duty
will be discharged by warning the patient of the risks associated with the disease, as
well as by giving advice about how to prevent the spread of disease) with N.O.L. v.
District of Columbia, 674 A.2d 498 (D.C. 1995) (holding that there is no duty to warn
plaintiff of his wife's HIV status). For a more complete discussion of the HIV, see
King, supra, at 16-22.
205 King, supra note 204, at 22-37. See EARLY WARNING, supra note 176, at
15, 84-86. Common law is still developing its duty to warn doctrine in the genetics
context: compare Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So.2d 278 (Fla. 1995) (holding that physician
had a duty to patient's children to warn patient that a genetically heritable disease
existed and that patient's children should be tested; physician's duty is discharged by
warning the patient) with Safer v. Estate of Pack, 677 A.2d 1188, 1192 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1996) (finding a duty to warn of heritable genetic disease and that the
duty is satisfied when reasonable steps are take to assure that the information reaches
those likely to be affected or is made available for their benefit). Some legislatures
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screened and avoid the ravages of the disease. Without the
knowledge, they are less likely to seek screening, especially at a
relatively early age.
Medical resources are limited, some are scarce. Whenever a
decision is made to expend a scarce resource by using it for one
person, every other competitor for the resource is affected by the
decision. Obvious examples include shortages of beds in intensive
care units and the serious shortage of transplantable organs. This
problem has long been recognized. Thirty years ago, when chronic
renal dialysis became possible, grand social experiments were
designed and implemented to attempt to allocate scarce dialysis
machines fairly.2 °6 The efforts failed,20 7 and the problem was
eventually solved by making enough resources available so that the
shortage was corrected, 20 8 but nobody doubted then or now that more
than just the interests of the patient who happened to show up first for
dialysis had to be considered.
Another setting in which somebody's interests in addition to the
patient's have to be considered is the situation in which the patient
poses a danger to others, not by exposing them to disease, but by the
patient's conduct. The most frequently discussed example is the
situation typified by the Tarasoffr0 9 case in which a psychotherapist's
patient told the psychotherapist that he planned to kill his girlfriend.
In a decision that has been widely followed 210 the California Supreme
Court imposed an obligation on the psychotherapist to make a
have taken it upon themselves to enact statutes specifically protecting the
confidentiality of genetic information. E.g., CAL. CiV. CODE § 56.17 (West 2003).
206 See generally RENEE C. Fox & JUDITH P. SWAZEY, THE COURAGE TO FAIL:
A SOCIAL VIEW OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS AND DIALYSIS 215-315 (2d ed. 1978) (noting




209 Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
2 10 E.g., Emerich v. Philadelphia Ctr. for Human Dev., 720 A.2d 1032 (Pa.
1998) rearg denied (Jan. 13, 1999); Limon v. Gonzaba, 940 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. App.
1997); Almonte v. New York Med. College, 851 F. Supp. 34 (D. Conn. 1994)
(including duty to warn a class of victims). Additionally, the majority in Currie v.
United States, 644 F. Supp. 1074, 1078 (M.D.N.C. 1986), not only applied Tarasoff
to North Carolina, but also noted that "the vast majority of courts that have
considered the issue have accepted the Tarasoff analysis." Currie at 1078. As of
March 2003, there were 571 combined state and federal cases citing Tarasoff See
Keycite References for 551 P.2d 334: limited to cases, at www.westlaw.com (last
visited Mar. 12, 2003). Although many of the cases listed are within California, 532
of the total number of citing cases treated Tarasoffpositively. Id.
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reasonable effort to warn the intended victim. 211  Similarly, a few
cases have held doctors liable for failing to take reasonable steps to
protect motorists from bad driving caused by the doctor's prescription
of a drug to his or her patient.21 2 My colleagues and I have discussed
the case of a commercial airline pilot who has been diagnosed as
carrying the mutation that will lead to Huntington's Disease. 213 Can
anyone believe that the fate of the pilot's passengers is irrelevant to
deciding what the physician's obligations are?
The exclusive, fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient relationship
exacerbates the problem of ignoring the interests of relevant others or
of deciding how to advert to them. This is especially unfortunate,
given that who the patient is often is a matter of luck that turns on
who got to the doctor first, rather than on dessert, and the obvious
possibility that a doctor may owe duties to more than one patient.
V. CHANGING FOCUS
The autonomy focus and the exclusive, fiduciary nature of the
doctor-patient relationship fail to deliver on their promise of patient-
centered decision making and freedom of patient choice while
depriving patients of some of the benefits professionals can offer,
exposing some patients to abuse, and undervaluing the interests of
2 Tarasoff 551 P.2d at 346. The Tarasoff court proclaimed that although
there was generally no duty to "control the conduct of another" or to "warn those
endangered by such conduct," there was an exception when the person who knew of
the threat had a special relationship with either the potential perpetrator of the harm or
the foreseeable victim. Id. at 343. The court arrived at a duty to warn through
reasoning that "by entering into a doctor-patient relationship the therapist becomes
sufficiently involved to assume some responsibility for the safety, not only of the
patient himself, but also of any third person whom the doctor knows to be threatened
by the patient." Id. at 344. Tarasoff was revisited and subsequently narrowed in
Thompson v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728 (Cal. 1980), where the Supreme
Court of California found no duty to warn about "nonspecific threats of harm at
nonspecific victims", but rather to victims that are "readily identifiable." Id. at 734.
212 See, e.g., Wilschinsky v. Medina, 775 P.2d 713 (N.M. 1989) (holding that
a doctor owes a duty to third parties from treatment of an outpatient when the doctor
has given the patient an injection of drugs that could clearly impair the patient's
ability to reason and to operate an automobile). But cf Lester ex rel. Mavrogenis v.
Hall, 970 P.2d 590, 591, 598 (N.M. 1998) (declining to extend the Wilschinsky
holding to a scenario where the plaintiff was injured by defendant physician's patient
when the defendant had prescribed medication that allegedly caused the accident five
days prior to the accident). See also, e.g., Welke v. Kuzilla, 375 N.W.2d 403 (Mich.
App. 1985) (holding that physician does have a duty to protect innocent third parties
on the road when the physician determines or should determine that his patient poses
serious threat of danger to a third party).
213 EARLY WARNING, supra note 176, at 62-67.
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persons who have important stakes in the patient's medical condition
and treatment. Correcting these problems without returning to
unbridled medical paternalism or giving doctors authority that exceeds
their expertise requires rethinking the commitment to autonomy and
traditional notions of the doctor-patient relationship. Much can be
accomplished by changing the doctor's obligation from one of acting
with exclusive loyalty to the patient and fostering patient autonomy to
one of acting with respect to all significantly affected individuals.1 4
The critical changes of focus are from autonomy to respect and from
the patient to all significantly affected individuals.
Under this approach the doctor's obligation is to act with respect.
Commentators often treat respect as synonymous with commitment to
autonomy.2 15 Under this conception of respect, we respect a person
most when we do the least for him; the way to respect a person is to
abandon him in his hour of need.216 Thus, a doctor shows a person
respect when he or she refuses to tell the patient what the doctor
would do in the patient's situation or allows the patient to make a
short-sighted or even stupid decision about accepting or rejecting
treatment or about choosing between treatment alternatives without
attempting to dissuade him. This is a very impoverished notion of
respect.
A better conception of respect would be rooted in the idea that we
are all members of the human community and that we owe each other
obligations of mutuality and concern. This is hardly a radical idea. It
is, in essence, the golden rule. Under this view saying that the
doctor's job is to act with respect toward the patient means that the
doctor's job is to do what is best for the patient within the limits of the
doctor's expertise, valuing all the patient's interests, including the
patient's interest in autonomy. Granting heavy, but not dispositive
weight to autonomy is what distinguishes this part of the suggested
approach from mere paternalism.
Under this conception of respect the doctor's role (in addition to
performing medical tasks competently) is to give advice to try to steer
the patient to the best decision. When the patient asks what he should
do or what the doctor would do if he were in the patient's situation,
the doctor should tell the patient. The doctor should, when necessary,
argue with the patient to try to convince the patient to do the right
214 For a discussion of the term "respect", see Sarah Buss, Appearing
Respectful: The Moral Significance of Manners, 109 ETHICS 795 (1999).
215 See generally, e.g., id. at 797 (citing Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of
Morals, Part II, in ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY 127 (James W. Ellington trans., 1983)).
216 See Buss, supra note 214, at 817-26 (defining "respect").
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thing. Ultimately, however, the patient must remain free to reject the
doctor's advice.
This view of respect is similar to Mill's view of autonomy, which,
as noted before, imposes an obligation on others to attempt to get a
person to do the right thing, even while denying those others the
authority to require the person to do the right thing.217 Adopting this
approach will increase the benefit that individual patients receive from
their physicians. It will retain at least as much autonomy as patients
now enjoy while reducing patients' sense of abandonment and
decision making inadequacy, and it should improve the quality of
medical decisions that are made.
However, focusing on respect for the patient alone will not solve
the other problems with the autonomy focus and the exclusive,
fiduciary doctor-patient relationship. In order to provide adequate
attention to the needs of others, the doctor's obligation to act with
respect should be extended to all significantly affected individuals.
This means that doctors should be obligated to consider the interests
of reasonably identifiable other persons who may be significantly
affected by the patient's health and the doctor's treatment of it.
Taking this position will impose a number of specific duties on
doctors.
First, doctors should routinely breach confidence to warn of
contagious diseases, genetic diseases and other dangers. As we have
seen, a few examples of this obligation already exist, as for example
in the case of a psychotherapist with a homicidal patient. 218 I suggest
that rather than being an exception to a presumed rule of
confidentiality, the obligation to make reasonable efforts to warn
should be clearly established as one of a doctor's routine obligations.
Three obvious objections to such a rule exist. One might think
that imposing an obligation to make a reasonable effort to warn will
reduce the quality of patient care, will injure patients, and/or will
impose an excessive burden on doctors. None of these concerns is
meritorious.
When Tarasoff was decided critics feared that it would reduce
219both the quantity and quality of psychiatric care. Some potential
217 See MILL, supra note 172, at 93 (observing that people may offer, but not
force, their opinions on others).
218 See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 346 (Cal.
1976) (stating that entering into the doctor-patient relationship is sufficient to assume
responsibility for the safety of the patient or third persons whom the doctor knows to
be threatened by the patient).
219 See, e.g., Vanessa Merton, Confidentiality and the "Dangerous" Patient.
Implications of Tarasoff for Psychiatrists and Lawyers, 31 EMORY L.J. 263 (1982).
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patients would refrain from consulting psychiatrists if they knew that
some of their confidences would not be honored. Others might seek
psychiatric help but refuse to be forthcoming with their therapists,
thereby reducing the likelihood that their therapy would be effective.
However, in the quarter century since Tarasoff its rule has been
adopted in many states, 22 and there is no evidence that it has injured
the practice of psychiatry in any way. 22' Given that many mental
illnesses are widely stigmatized in our society, it seems unlikely that
extending the Tarasoff obligation beyond psychotherapy will have a
negative effect on other aspects of medicine either.
Of course, breaches of confidentiality will upset many patients.
However, avoiding individual upset is no reason to allow innocent
third parties to suffer the avoidable ravages of communicable or
genetic diseases or to be exposed to physical danger. To the extent
that more than upset is involved, for example if a particular breach of
confidentiality exposes a patient to the risk of losing a job or
insurance benefits, some statutory protections already exist. 222 If they
are insufficient, then perhaps they should be strengthened. We can
protect patients from the harms associated with a loss of
confidentiality without foisting worse harms onto others.
The concern that doctors will be overburdened is mistaken. It
proceeds from forgetting that duties are obligations to make
reasonable efforts to achieve certain ends, not obligations to achieve
them.223 The duty on the psychotherapist in Tarasoff was not a duty
to warn the intended victim. It was a duty to make a reasonable effort
to warn her.224 That is a very different and less burdensome thing.
For a comprehensive listing of articles discussing Tarasoff's implications for mental
health professionals, see Peter F. Lake, Revisting Tarasoff 58 ALB. L. REV. 97, 101 &
n.14 (1994).
220 E.g., Davis v. Lhim, 335 N.W.2d 481, 489 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); Lake,
supra note 219, at 100 nn. 12-13
221 See Daniel J. Givelber et al., Tarasoff Myth and Reality: An Empirical
Study of Private Law in Action, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 443 (1984) (finding that Tarasoff
is consistent with therapists' ethical obligations).
222 E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-6-5 (Burns 2002). See also 42 U.S.C. §§
1320d-1320d-8 (Supp. 2002) (setting forth elaborate federal protections for privacy of
health care information); 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.101-164.534 (2002).
223 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 (1965) (noting that an
individual must merely conform to conduct of a particular nature to avoid liability for
breach of duty).
224 Tarasoff 551 P.2d at 347 ("[i]f the exercise of reasonable care to protect
the threatened victim requires the therapist to warn the endangered party or those who
can reasonably be expected to notify him, we see no sufficient societal interest that
would protect and justify concealment").
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Similarly, in the genetic and communicable disease contexts
recognizing that doctors owe duties to persons in addition to their
patients means only that they must treat such persons reasonably.
This means three things: (1) Doctors only have to try to warn third
parties if the third party can take some meaningful action based on the
warning to protect himself or someone close to him. (2) Doctors only
have to make reasonable efforts to warn third parties. (3) The
reasonableness of a breach of confidence and attempt to warn includes
consideration of the patient's interests in maintaining confidentiality.
For example, if a patient has Huntington's Disease a duty to
behave reasonably to that patient's relatives would not require a
doctor to make any effort to seek out and warn the patient's
unmarried, childless, 60-year-old sibling. The sibling could not do
anything with the information, and so there is no need to give it to him
or her. In addition, the likelihood that the sibling would develop HD
if he or she were asymptomatic at age 60 is very small.
A doctor may be obligated to make reasonable efforts to warn
close relatives of a person with FAP. That may require the doctor to
ask the patient for names and addresses and even to look for
distinctive names in a small town's telephone directory if that is
where the patient lives. It will not require the doctor to try to find
every person named Jones in Manhattan to ascertain whether they are
related to patient Jones. Similarly, it is likely that sending the relative
a letter or leaving a message on the relative's answering machine will
be enough to satisfy the doctor's duty to make a reasonable effort to
warn. The doctor will not have to drag the relative kicking and
screaming into the clinic.
Finally, if the patient has special confidentiality needs that exceed
the privacy concerns everyone has, then behaving reasonably may
relieve the doctor of an obligation to make any effort at all to warn
others. For example, if the patient's fear of losing a job is based on
specific facts like the patient's employer saying he will fire anyone
who is HIV positive, that is a special circumstance that reduces the
likelihood that the doctor will be obligated to inform third parties
about the patient's condition.
A second obligation that flows from an obligation to act
respectfully toward all significantly affected individuals is the
obligation to take other people's interests into account when advising
the patient. The doctor should try to get the patient to do the right
thing. For example, consanguineous twins have identical genetic
make-ups. Thus, if one twin has a genetic disease, the other twin will
also have the disease. If a patient seeks presymptomatic testing for a
genetic disease, but the patient's consanguineous twin does not want
to learn his genetic status, the doctor should work with the patient to
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protect the twin's preference. One twin's preference to remain
uninformed about his genetic condition cannot justify refusing to test
the other twin, but it does suggest that the doctor should explain to his
patient the consequences of the diagnosis to the other twin and should
emphasize the importance of the patient not divulging his diagnosis to
his twin. 225 Similarly, a physician deciding whether to do prenatal
diagnosis of a fetus to discover whether it will inherit an autosomal
dominant disease for which its father is at risk, should counsel the
mother about the risks to her husband involved in learning unwanted
information about himself and should become satisfied that the
husband's as well as the wife's and fetuses interests have been taken
into consideration.226
A third setting in which it is appropriate to consider interests in
addition to the patient's is the allocation of scarce medical resources.
Everybody understands that triage decisions in emergencies
necessarily involve comparing the competing interests of different
individuals. The same reasoning that leads to that conclusion leads
also to the conclusion that multiple persons' interests must be
considered when deciding how to allocate scarce resources in other
situations as well. We already have systems that compare potential
organ recipients in order to decide how to allocate one scarce
resource. 227  Similar mechanisms are appropriate for allocating
intensive care beds and any other medical resource that may be in
short supply. There is plenty of room to argue about which allocation
system - degree of illness, likelihood of success, age, social worth,
etc. - is the best, but some allocation system there must be, and any
system except the most arbitrary must take more than one person's
interests into account.
225 EARLY WARNING, supra note 176, at 24; Reisner v. Regents of the Univ. of
California., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518 (1995), was an HIV duty to warn case, where the
court held that a physician's duty to warn is discharged by warning the patient of the
risks associated with the disease, as well as by giving advice on how to prevent the
spread of the disease. That a doctor must give advice on "how to avoid the spread of
the disease" necessarily includes taking potential sexual partners', family, and health
care providers' interests in not contracting HIV into account - essentially, the
California court demanded that physicians advise their patients with others' interests
in mind. Id.
226 EARLY WARNING, supra note176, at 42-45.
227 The United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) manages the national
transplant waiting list, matches donors to recipients, develops policy to maximize
organ supply, sets professional standards for efficiency and quality of patient care,
and maintains the national database that contains all clinical transplant data. For more
information on UNOS and transplant management efforts, see http://www.unos.org
(last visited Oct. 25, 2001).
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Finally, the law should recognize that no person is an island.
Every significant decision about a patient's health may have an impact
on that person's relatives, dependents, and others. At least some
attention should be paid to those interests. To facilitate the death of a
35-year-old married parent of four children who has a good chance of
recovering from his or her disease or injuries without considering the
needs of the spouse and children would be to abstract the patient from
his or her entire social context and to make a decision out of keeping
with that patient's life plan and obligations. The problem with the
Spring case228 is not that Mrs. Spring's interests were considered. The
problems are that her interests were weighed too heavily against those
of Mr. Spring, who could not speak for himself; that they were
considered surreptitiously; and that the court used the language of
patient autonomy to run roughshod over Mr. Spring's autonomy and
his life.
Thus, it is clear that medical decision making that focuses
exclusively on the patient is shortsighted and inadequate. However, it
is possible to go too far in considering the interests of others. Proper
consideration should be given to the interests of reasonably
identifiable, significantly affected individuals. Consideration should
not be given to the interests of society as a whole.
While one might argue that the interests of society as a whole are
best served by creating a concerned and loving environment in which
each person can be secure in the knowledge that he or she will be
treated with respect and without abuse, that is not a realistic picture of
what attention to the public interest would mean. The public interest
inevitably descends to concern about fostering those who are best able
to "contribute" to the common welfare and to concern about
protecting the taxpayers. Both of those concerns lead to imposition on
the sick and the poor. The sick, especially the seriously or fatally ill,
are unlikely to make much contribution to the common welfare. They
will cost more than they will produce. Spending money on them will
increase the cost of medical care for those who buy insurance and for
the taxpayers who support the medicare and medicaid systems. Thus,
consideration of the needs of society as a whole will lead to decisions
to withhold treatment from low contributors, very sick people, and
people whose medical bills are paid by the rest of us. That is, it will
lead to lack of respect, lack of protection for autonomy, bad medical
care, and invidious discrimination against the poorest and most
228 In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1980); for a discussion see text
accompanying notes 195-99, supra.
[Vol. 13:235
GETTING WHAT WE SHOULD
desperate members of society. The balance between the needs of
individuals and the needs of the community is best struck by adopting
a system that adverts to the interests of significantly affected
individuals, ignoring the interests of those who are affected only in the
sense that everything that is done to one person necessarily has an
effect on all others.
VI. THE LAW
Changing focus from patient autonomy to respect for all
significantly affected individuals should rid the law of fiction; reduce
opportunities for abuse of patients (although, abuse cannot be
eliminated altogether); promote people's actual desires; foster good
medical care; give society the benefits it deserves in exchange for the
support it provides to professionals; and lead to decisions that do not
arbitrarily ignore the needs of obviously relevant persons. What steps
can the law take to accomplish these goals?
First, the law should eliminate the cause of action for lack of
informed consent. As I have already shown, the informed consent
cause of action does nothing to promote or protect patient
autonomy.2 29 That is not surprising. Many features of the cause of
action lead to its lack of utility.
First, its basic premise is unsound. There is no reason to believe
that doctors can successfully explain highly complicated scientific
matters to lay persons under the best of circumstances. 230  Medical
decision making requires an ability to understand some scientific
concepts and to engage in probabilistic reasoning. Most Americans
cannot do that.23' Moreover, every teacher knows that the gap
between what a teacher says and what a student learns is enormous
despite the fact that at least at the higher levels of education students
are intelligent, previously educated, and largely self-selected and,
therefore, interested in learning.
229 Text accompanying notes 67-83, supra.
230 See Caroline L. Kaufmann, Medical Education and Physician-Patient
Communication, in 3 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, Vol. 3, app. I
(1982) (discussing whether the criteria for selecting medical students or the
curriculum itself is to blame for physicians' inability to communicate well with
patients).
231 William C. Thompson, Psychological Issues in Informed Consent,
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS,
VOLUME THREE: APPENDICES STUDIES ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT
83, at 86-87 (1982).
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Doctor-patient communication, of course, does not take place
under the best of circumstances. Typically, it involves a patient who
is frightened or suffering or both, listening to an authority figure upon
whom the patient depends for relief of the fear and/or suffering, in a
conversation that takes place on hostile turf (a hospital or doctor's
office) and with the doctor decked out in garb (white coat with
stethoscope around neck) that reinforces the distance and power
relationship between the doctor and the patient. Moreover, doctors
receive little or no training in communication skills, especially the
skills required to communicate with suffering, frightened laypersons.
Who could expect these discussions to lead to informed decision-
making by patients. Compliant (and smart) patients do what the
doctor recommends (if the doctor is willing to make a
recommendation); others resist. But the likelihood that either the
acceptors or the resisters are making meaningfully informed choices is
small indeed.
In addition, tort law is ill suited to enforce the informed consent
ideal for several reasons: First the law is forced to go at the entire
inquiry backwards. The question the law wants to answer is whether
the patient had adequate information to autonomously exercise his
will. In other words, what was in the patient's mind? However, the
law does not ask what was in the patient's mind. Instead, it asks what
the doctor did. Did the doctor tell the patient enough? 232 There are
two good reasons for the law to do that: First the legal issue is
whether to impose liability on the doctor. The doctor can control
what he tells the patient. He cannot control what the patient hears,
thinks, knows, or understands. It would be unfair to impose liability
on the doctor for something he cannot control. Therefore, the law
asks what the doctor did, rather than what the patient knew. Second,
there is no reliable way for the law to ascertain what the patient knew
at the time he gave his consent. It is much easier to find out what the
doctor said. Therefore, courts do what is doable. They ask what the
doctor told the patient. This is all perfectly sensible in terms of the
limitations of law, but it does mean that the inquiry is backwards. It is
easy to predict that law that must be done backwards is not going to
work out very well.233
232 For a general overview of modem informed consent, see generally Paula
Walter, The Doctrine of In/brmed Consent: To Inform or Not to Inform?, 71 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 543 (1997).
2-3 Compare, for example, the well known examples of rape and confessions
law. In rape prosecutions focusing on the victim's resistance or lack of consent may
be the only practical way to prove the defendant's mens rea, but doing so has the
undesirable result of turning prosecutions into trials of victims. In confessions cases,
[Vol. 13:235
GETTING WHAT WE SHOULD
Another reason that tort law is ill equipped to deal with informed
consent is that tort law is primarily common law. Common law
decides cases after the events the law is dealing with have already
happened, and it focuses on the highly specific facts of each case to
reach its decisions.234 This approach has many virtues. However, it is
not good for obtaining conduct control in specific cases. 235 One of the
main goals of informed consent law is to make doctors behave a
certain way. To be effective the law has to tell doctors clearly and in
advance what they have to tell their patients. Common law does not
do that, and so it is ineffective in achieving its aims. Left to guess
what to say to a patient a doctor will either over inform to try to avoid
all risk of liability or under inform to take advantage of the fact that
without a highly unlikely injury occurring, he will be safe from
liability. Neither of those strategies fosters patient autonomy. Of
course, the existence of malpractice insurance, which makes the
doctor's cost of liability much less than the cost of the patient's injury,
reduces the deterrent efficacy of the law even further.
However, this does not mean the law of informed consent is
without impact. Doctors know that failing to obtain a patient's
informed consent can lead to liability. Therefore, rather than thinking
of informed consent as an ethical obligation to engage in meaningful
conversation with the patient, many doctors see informed consent as
one more legal hoop to jump through. This attitude is captured in the
common medical use of the word, "consent," as a transitive verb, as in
"Who is going to consent the patient?" Whoever "consents" the
patient is unlikely to have done much to advance the patient's
understanding or the cause of patient autonomy. To the extent that
informed consent is a good idea, the way to foster its goals is to
educate doctors about informed consent as an ethical goal and to train
them in the art of communicating highly complex technical
information to frightened, suffering, dependent laypersons. The mere
fact that informed consent is an attractive aspiration does not mean
that failure to attain it should give rise to a cause of action in tort.
focusing on whether the police have complied with formal requirements makes cases
turn on technicalities rather than whether the defendant was acting voluntarily when
he confessed. This results in inadequate protections for defendants and frustration for
law enforcers.
234 For a brief primer on common law adjudication, see LIMITS, supra note 49,
at 7-10.
235 It may achieve vague, general conduct control, for example, by making
product manufacturers as a group internalize more of the costs associated with their
products, but it is incapable of directing specific actions.
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If the truth about informed consent is that the doctrine provides a
useful way for patients to recover for malpractice when they are
unable to prove physician negligence,236 then that suggests that
something is fundamentally wrong with the law of malpractice.
Either patients should be allowed to recover despite the absence of
provable negligence, or they shouldn't. It is not appropriate to allow
some patients to avoid the requirements of malpractice law by resort
to a fiction that is not available to other similarly situated patients.
The only function the cause of action for lack of informed consent
serves is to arbitrarily and occasionally mitigate the harshness of the
malpractice system. If mitigation is needed, it should be achieved
more directly. This is especially true because, as suggested above, the
tort cause of action distorts and reduces meaningful doctor-patient
communication.
The second change in the law suggested by the respect-for-all-
significantly-affected-individuals focus is the elimination of the
substituted judgment test and its replacement by the best interests of
the patient test.237 A substituted judgment test purports to have a
surrogate decision maker ascertain what a patient would choose for
himself if he were competent to make a choice and then to effectuate
that presumed choice. As our discussion of the Spring case has
already demonstrated, it is easy to abuse the substituted judgment test
and to run roughshod over an incompetent person in the name of
serving his autonomy. 238 The same phenomenon is present in cases
about whether children or incompetent persons may be used as organ
donors. 239 A parent with a mentally retarded or just a young child
with two healthy kidneys and another child in need of a kidney
transplant will naturally be eager to transplant a kidney from the
healthy child to the sibling. Obviously, the parent's conflict of
interest precludes the parent's consent to the transplant from being
236 Meisel, supra note 1, at 1399.
237 See supra note 156 for an explanation of these two different standards.
238 See text accompanying notes 195-99, infra.
239 See Bryan Shartle, Proposed Legislation for Safely Regulating the
Increasing Number of Living Organ and Tissue Donations by Minors, 61 LA. L. REV.
433 (2001) (discussing proposed legislation and the need for minor organ donors).
See also Robert W. Griner, Live Organ Donations between Siblings and the Best
Interest Standard: Time for Stricter Judicial Intervention, 10 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 589,
589-91 (1994) ("[t]he possibility of organ transplants from a living donor adds
numerous complicating factors"); Hal Daniel Friedman, Note, The Greatest Gift, But
At What Cost? - Objections to Court-Compelled Organ Donation in Aid of a Family
Member, 30 J. FAM. L. (1991-92) (noting that courts have refused to order minors to
donate organs if there is no parental consent or the relationship between the donor and
donee is not sufficiently close that there will be no psychological benefit to the child).
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enough to authorize it. A court order is required. Courts, however, do
little to protect potential donor children. Applying a substituted
judgment test, they routinely authorize the transplants, attributing to
the potential donor altruism 240 or a desire to have a sibling to care for
him after his parents die.24' Maybe taking healthy kidneys from
children and giving them to their siblings is sound social policy, but
let us not deceive ourselves into believing that in pursuing that policy
we are promoting the autonomy and honoring the decisions of donor
children.
Not only is the substituted judgment test susceptible to abuse, it is
also impossible to apply. Even in the case of previously competent
patients there is little hope of applying the test sensibly. Most people
have never thought about, much less expressed an opinion about what
they would choose if presented with one of life's innumerable health
crises.24 2 Not only have they not addressed each specific situation,
they have provided no basis from which to extrapolate a choice. Even
if they have said something relevant, there is little reason to believe
that their abstract past expression reflects their desire when they are
actually presented with the previously hypothetical situation.243
If the substituted judgment test is nearly impossible to apply to
formerly competent patients, it is completely impossible to use with
patients who have never been competent. By definition such persons
cannot have expressed a meaningful view about health care options.
As one wag noted in a now famous attack on the use of the substituted
240 See, e.g., Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (resolving
that the record demonstrated that the incompetent donor would experience
psychological benefits from donating a kidney to her brother, but limiting the holding
to situations where the donee is a parent or sibling).
241 But see In re Richardson, 284 So.2d 185, 187 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (holding
that such an argument is highly speculative). See also Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d
145 (Ky. 1969) (discussing the doctrine of substituted judgment).
242 According to the U.S. Living Will Registry, a privately funded
organization that electronically stores "advance directives" (living wills or health care
proxies) and makes them available to health care providers, although 75% of
Americans are in favor of advance directives, only 25-30% have actually prepared an
advance directive. U.S. Living Will Registry, at
http://uslivingwillregistry.com/factsheet.shtm (last visited Mar. 12, 2003) (on file with
author).
243 See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser, Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients:
Conceptual Infirmities and Hidden Values in the Law, 28 ARIz. L. REV. 373, 379
(1986) (arguing that past and present expressions of goals and desires cannot be
adequately determined without the input of the patient); Harvey Max Chochinov et
al., Will to Live in the Terminally 11, 354 LANCET 816, 818-19 (1999) (finding that
desires for death and the will to live were highly unstable among terminally ill cancer




judgment test to ascertain the desires of a never competent leukemia
patient in his sixties, who had a mental age of two, asking what the
patient would choose if he were competent is like asking, "If it
snowed all summer, would it then be winter?1
44
This impossible and easily abused test, which does not actually
protect patient autonomy, ignores all values other than autonomy.245
A better way to decide what should be done for incompetent patients
is to ask what would be best for them (subject to appropriate
consideration of the interests of other significantly affected
individuals). That approach requires focus on reality, rather than
fiction and it considers many relevant interests, not just one: What
chance of recovery does the patient have? How full will the recovery
be? How much pain and other suffering will the procedure and its
aftermath entail? What will the patient's life be like after the
procedure? What will the procedure do to the patient's place in his
family and community? 246 Etc., etc., and, if there is any meaningful
evidence of the patient's desires, what does that evidence show? This
kind of a multi-faceted, reality based test forces the decision maker to
focus on what the real interests of the patient are. It makes it harder
(of course, not impossible) to make things up. It reduces the chance
of riding roughshod over the patient. No legal test can guarantee that
future Mr. Springs will not be abused, but the best interests test at
least will force courts to look at what they are doing and to come to
grips with the fact that if they allow the Earl Springs of the world to
die, they are deciding that such people are better off dead than alive.
They are not just respecting the patient's wishes.
Third, courts should restrict the patient's cause of action for
breach of confidence in order to permit doctors to consider and act on
the needs of others as well as those of the patient. I have already
demonstrated the importance of considering the important interests of
reasonably identifiable third parties.247 In cases where those interests
are more important than the patient's interest in confidentiality,
doctors should be freed of the concern that they will be liable to their
244 In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72-73 (N.Y. 1981). See also LIMITS, supra
note 49, at 119 (discussing the problem with the substituted judgment approach
relating to incompetent persons).
245 This is the case except in instances in which courts treat substituted
judgment as synonymous with the best interests of the patient, evidently assuming
that a patient will always choose what is best for himself.
246 This is especially relevant in cases in which the patient is a member of a
close-knit community with deeply held views, like the Jehovah's Witnesses antipathy
to blood transfusions.
247 Infra at text accompanying notes 200-13.
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patients if they breach confidentiality to serve more important
interests.
The cause of action for breach of confidentiality is not very well
established, 248 and it lacks a sound theoretical grounding.249 Despite
the common assumption that doctors owe an obligation to maintain
their patients' confidences, few cases actually enforce that obligation
by awarding damages for its breach.25° Perhaps that is because the
obligation is sufficiently enshrined in medical ethics that few breaches
occur, or perhaps it is because few breaches cause significant damage.
In any event, the paucity of cases suggests that eliminating the cause
of action will not do much harm.
It is difficult to find legal underpinning for a cause of action for
breach of confidentiality. The demise of the prima facie tort
doctrine,25' which would have made a tort out of almost any
intentional infliction of harm, suggests that one must find a more
specific justification for a cause of action than simply wanting to
compensate all harm.
Some states purport to find a basis for the cause of action in the
doctor-patient testimonial privilege. 252 However, that privilege, which
248 See generally, e.g., Susan M. Gilles, Promises Betrayed: Breach of
Confidence as a Remedy for Invasions of Privacy, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1995)
(discussing the viability of breach of confidence as a remedy for those injured by
unwanted publication of private facts).
249 Id. at 4-13. But see, for an early, generally positive, background of the rise
of the breach of confidence tort, Alan B. Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence: An
Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1426 (1982).
20 See, e.g., McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431, 437 (S.C. Ct. App.
1997) (building on the recognition of a physician's duty of confidentiality in S.
Carolina State Bd. Of Med. Exam'rs v. Hedgepath, 480 S.E.2d 724 (S.C. 1997),
"recogniz[ing] a cause of action for a physician's breach of a duty of
confidentiality"). McCormick at 432.
251 Justice Holmes stated that "prima facie, the intentional infliction of
temporal damage is a cause of action, which, as a matter of substantive law whatever
may be the form of pleading, requires a justification if the defendant is to escape."
Aikins v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 204 (1904). Prima facie tort was later defined as
the infliction of intentional harms, resulting in damage, without excuse or
justification, by an act or series of acts which would otherwise be lawful. Firester v.
Lipson, 270 N.Y.S.2d 844, 850 (1966). The problem with this rule is that if prima
facie tort really made actionable any intentional infliction of damage, it would abolish
all other forms and theories of action. E.g., Fieger v. Glen Oaks Vili., 132 N.E.2d
492, 496 (N.Y. 1956).
252 Although at common law neither the physician nor the patient may refuse
to disclose communication between the two, many states have enacted statutes
specifically creating this privilege. E.g., Quarles v. Sutherland, 389 S.W.2d 249, 251
(1965). For a very fully developed statutory treatment of the privilege, see Cal. Evid.
Code §§ 990-1007 (West, 1995). For an example of where the physician-patient
privilege was used to find a basis for the breach of confidentiality, see Schaffer v.
2003]
HEALTH MATRIX
applies in the litigation setting, tells us nothing about whether a
patient whose doctor divulges a confidence in a different setting
should incur liability to the patient. The balance of interests in
resolving litigation and in creating causes of action bear almost no
relationship to each other. Moreover, the doctor-patient testimonial
privilege itself is sufficiently hard to justify that it seems ill advised to
attempt to expand it beyond its limited sphere.
The tort of invasion of privacy does not seem to provide a sound
basis for a breach of confidentiality cause of action. 53 If one accepts
Prosser's 254 and the Restatement's 255 categories of invasion of privacy
cases, breach of confidence seems most likely to be a public exposure
of embarrassing private facts.256 However, the elements of that cause
of action will seldom be met in the breach of confidence setting. The
tort claim requires a public disclosure, 257 not just a "publication" to
one third party like defamation requires. 258  Therefore, very few
breach of confidentiality cases will fit. Moreover, the invasion of
privacy claim also requires that the information disclosed not be of
legitimate interest to the public. 259 In the cases we are considering
here, disclosure will be important at least to the segment of the public
to whom disclosure is made.
Similarly, breach of confidentiality does not seem to constitute a
highly offensive intrusion into the solitude or private affairs of the
plaintiff. This is not like spying or eavesdropping on the patient.26°
Moreover, as Justice Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court has
pointed out, if a person has an invasion of privacy cause of action for
disclosure of medical information, that cause of action would exist
against anyone, not simply a doctor.26' Persons trying to find a valid
Spicer, 215 N.W.2d 134, 136, 138 (S.D. 1974)
253 See Gilles, supra note 248, at 4-13.
254 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
255 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B-652E (1977). The
Restatement recognizes for distinct branches of privacy torts: 1) intrusion upon
seclusion; 2) appropriation of name or likeness; 3) publicity given to private life; and
4) publicity placing person in false light. §§ 652B-652E (1977). Also, see Vickery,
supra note 248, at 1437-48, for a discussion of these causes of action in relation to a
breach of confidence.
256 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (prohibiting publicity, that
is either "highly offensive" and "not of legitimate concern to the public").
257 See id., at cmt. A (defining "[plublicity").
258 id.
259 Id. § 652D(b).
260 E.g., Nader v. General Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 770-71 (N.Y. 1970)
(holding that unauthorized wiretapping and eavesdropping are activities that
constitute an invasion of privacy).
261 Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, 696 P.2d 527, 530 (Or.
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claim that is restricted to physicians, or at least to health care
professionals, must look for something specific in the doctor-patient
relationship that gives rise to such a case.
Two possible bases for the patient's claim would be that the
expectation of confidentiality arises out of the contract that creates the
doctor-patient relationship 262 or the expectation that doctors will
behave ethically. These suggestions, however, beg the essential
question: What are the terms of the doctor-patient contract, and what
are the dictates of medical ethics? Obviously, if the law rejects the
cause of action, a reasonable expectation of a legally enforceable
claim to confidentiality will not exist.
Of course, it is possible to adapt existing law to recognize a cause
of action for breach of medical confidentiality. Some courts have
done so. 263 The question is whether doing so is worthwhile, given the
important interests that are often served by breaches. Patients can
retain existing causes of action that cover specific injurious situations
without creating an all-purpose breach of confidentiality tort. For
example, an unjustified disclosure to an employer that causes the
patient to lose a job may give rise to a cause of action for interference
with a beneficial contractual relationship.26
Suppose, though, that a doctor breaches a patient's confidence for
an invalid reason, perhaps because the physician just likes to gossip.
Now the case may come closer to fitting into an existing doctrinal
pigeon hole. For example, it may be sufficiently widespread and
serve so little purpose that it will give rise to a claim for public
disclosure of embarrassing private facts.265 Even in the cases in which
recognizing the claim is worthwhile, however, a major problem exists.
How will the plaintiff prove damages, and what damages will be
recoverable? In cases in which plaintiffs suffer real losses, like the
1985).
262 E.g., id. at 528-29; Home v. Patton, 287 So.2d 824 (Ala. 1973) (holding
that an implied contract arises in the ordinary course of dealing between a doctor and
patient that information disclosed to the doctor concerning the patient's condition will
be held in confidence by the doctor).
263 E.g., Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518, 523 (Ohio 1999);
McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431, 435-37 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997). See
Humphers, 696 P.2d at 527 (permitting a claim against a physician for breach of
confidentiality when the physician identified a mothers identity to the daughter she
had give up for adoption).
264 See generally, e.g., French v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 55
F. Supp. 2d 379, 381 (W.D.N.C. 1999) (stating that an unauthorized and intentional
disclosure of medical records which prevent employment may create a claim based on
interference with contractual rights or intentional infliction of emotional distress).
265 Even if it does create such a claim, Justice Linde's argument about the
inability to limit the claim to cases against doctors will have to be confronted.
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loss of a job, recovery may be justified, and damages will be easy to
prove and measure. In cases where the plaintiff's only loss is the
unhappiness that comes from other persons learning his business, it is
hard to see why the legal system should devote its time and the public
should devote its resources in the form of increased medical costs to
compensate for that unhappiness. Not everything that makes people
unhappy is or should be a tort.
The fourth, related legal adjustment suggested by our
recommended approach is to provide a cause of action for reasonably
identifiable persons whose demonstrable interests a doctor has
negligently ignored. I have already explained the importance of those
26persons' interests. 66 Recognizing their claims requires no bold new
steps. Since Tarasoff67 the law has moved significantly toward
recognizing such claims. 268 All that is required is to continue that
development and to adopt a new mind set that recognizes that duties
to third parties are the rule, rather than the exception.
Restricting the patient's breach of confidentiality cause of action
while expanding the claims of significantly affected third parties is
consistent with actions the law already takes even if it seems
inconsistent with common assertions about what the law requires.
Black letter law states that there is no duty to take affirmative steps to
help other persons. There is no duty to be a Good Samaritan. 269 Also,
as noted some courts hold and most people assume that doctors do
have a duty to maintain their patients' confidences. 270 However, both
of these rules are often honored in the breach.
The reasons for the Good Samaritan rule are (1) that imposing
duties to render aid would create impossible line drawing problems;
which of the 500 motorists who passed a traffic accident without
stopping would be liable for damages his intervention could have
prevented? (2) that imposing liability would not achieve significant
loss spreading because of the absence of failure-to-rescue insurance;
and (3) that imposing a duty would not increase rescues because
people who fail to try to help others in peril are likely to be paralyzed
266 See text accompanying notes 203-13, supra.
267 Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
268 Lake, supra note 219, at 100 nn. 12-13.
269 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965) (noting that an
individual is not required to and another individual in distress on that basis alone).
270 Cf Humphers, 696 P.2d at 534-36, (discussing physicians' duties of
confidentiality); Home v. Patton, 287 So.2d 824, 829-30 (Ala. 1973) (concluding that
a medical doctor has a duty to refrain from making extra-judicial disclosures of
information obtained in the course of the doctor-patient relationship); Hague v.
Williams, 181 A.2d 345, 349 (N.J. 1962) (holding that generally physicians should
not reveal confidential patient information).
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by fear or horror and, therefore, beyond the deterrent force of the
law.271 Exceptions to the widely criticized rule are made whenever
the reasons for it, or at least some of them, are not present.
The reasons for the Good Samaritan rule do not apply in the
context of deciding whether a doctor should act reasonably toward
persons in addition to the doctor's patients. Line drawing is easy.
The doctor is readily identifiable, and at most a few other health
professionals may be in a similar position to act. Malpractice
insurance is available, and there seems no reason to deny coverage in
this context. And the doctor is making a considered judgment about
what is the right thing to do, not a snap decision while he is terrified
by the sight of an emergency.
The duty to maintain patient confidences yields to the supervening
public good. In addition to duties to report child abuse,272 gunshot
wounds,273 etc., doctors are often held liable for failing to make
reasonable efforts to warn or otherwise protect intended victims of
274their psychiatric patients, family members at risk for genetic
diseases,275 persons exposed to contagious diseases, 276 and even
unknown future drivers on the highway.277 Thus, recognizing a
general duty toward relevant third parties is consistent with the reality,
if not the rhetoric, of American law.
271 Don M. Reckseen, Note, The Duty to Rescue, 47 IND. L.J. 321, 329 (1972).
But see Viola C. Brady, Note, The Duty to Rescue in Tort Law: Implications of
Research on Altruism, 55 IND. L.J. 551, 556 (1980) (arguing that based on theories of
altruism, the "imposition of an expanded legal duty to aid would cause more persons
to render aid").
272 E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-33-5-2 (West 2001).
273 E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-7-1 (West 1998) (requiring reporting of
injuries caused by firearms).
274 The Tarasoff case, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) discussed earlier in this
article, and the jurisprudence following it are excellent, straightforward examples of
the public good trumping individual confidences in the American legal system. See
text accompanying notes 209-13, supra.
275 See, e.g., Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So.2d 278, 282 (Fla. 1995) (holding that a
physician owed a duty to a patient's family member to warn her of a hereditary
disease because the prevailing standard of care was developed for the benefit of
certain third parties and the physician knew of the existence of such third parties).
276 See King, supra note 204, at 14-16 (discussing the key cases establishing a
physician's duty to warn in the context of contagious diseases).
277 See supra note 212.
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VII. ESTABLISHING THE BOUNDS OF
PROFESSIONALISM
Eliminating the cause of action for lack of informed consent,
abandoning the substituted judgment test, restricting patients' claims
for breach of confidentiality, and expanding third parties' claims for
failing to behave reasonably toward them should go a long way
toward solving the problems caused by the focus on autonomy and the
exclusive doctor-patient relationship. However, the new approach
carries a potential danger that must be guarded against. Encouraging
doctors to consider all of a patient's interests, not just the interest in
autonomy, and encouraging doctors to consider persons in addition to
the patient raise the possibility that doctors may exceed the bounds of
professionalism. They may think the change of emphasis gives them
new power to impose their preferences in areas beyond their
professional expertise. This possibility must be prevented.
The insistence that only significantly affected individuals, not
society as a whole, be considered in determining doctors' obligations
is one step toward reining doctors in and preventing them from
foisting their political philosophies off onto the rest of us. But it is not
enough. Urging doctors to consider a wide range of interests of a
large number of persons does seem to invite them to act out their own
social preferences. In the absence of any reason to believe that
physicians' social preferences deserve privileged status, this apparent
invitation must be revoked.
I have argued that the present autonomy focus deprives us of
much of the potential benefit of having professionals. Obtaining that
full benefit does not require or suggest that we should privilege
nonprofessional views of physicians. The tricks are deciding what is
within the area of professional expertise and how to restrict physicians
to action within that area.
The most obvious foci for deciding what is within the professional
expertise of any group of professionals are their education and
experience. In addition, one can learn something about what the
society expects from professionals by studying the statutes that define
their scope of practice and provide for their licensure. However, none
of these tools is easy to use or without problems.
First, medical education is largely within the control of branches
of the medical profession - medical schools and medical residency
programs. In addition, what doctors experience depends on what they
choose to do. Therefore, medical educators could infinitely expand
medical education, and hence what counts as part of professional
expertise, simply by expanding medical curricula and the content of
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training programs. Doctors could expand the bounds of their
profession by doing, i.e., experiencing more things.
These are not substantial concerns. It is appropriate to expand
medical education to keep up with new developments. That medical
education now pays attention to genetics and nutrition is not a ground
for concern about overreaching. In addition, fears about an ever-
expanding field of medical power are unrealistic. The effect of
moving a new area into the sphere of medical expertise is to impose
more obligations on doctors. That fact plus the financial and time
constraints on medical education make unwarranted expansion
unlikely. As to experience, that too should pose no problem as long
as one remembers that the relevant experience is the experience of the
profession, not of an individual practitioner.
More troubling is the difficulty of defining what is meant by
education and experience. For example, medical education
increasingly includes some exposure to medical ethics. Sometimes it
even includes exposure to medical law. Does that mean that doctors
have been educated in ethics or law so that they are acting within the
realm of professionalism when they offer ethical guidance or give
legal advice? Clearly not. One could try to define ethics and law out
of medical practice by attempting to devise a "substantial education"
test or something of the sort, but ahy such effort would be exceedingly
difficult and doomed to failure. It would even be dangerous if, for
example, a medical school provided the same or a greater number of
contact hours in medical ethics that it provided in the anatomy of the
kidney.
At this point the medical practice acts come to our rescue.
Medical practice acts differ from state to state. They all attempt to
define the practice of medicine and to require licensure for those who
would engage in the practice. 278 Typical medical practice acts define
the practice of medicine to include certain important things that are
not relevant to the present inquiry, like holding oneself out as
279 ,8qualified to diagnose or treat, or using certain titles like "M.D. 28°
278 E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2050-2076 (West 1990) (explaining
licensing requirements and exemptions); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/1-63 (West
2002) (defining the practice of medicine to include the treatment or diagnosis of any
physical or mental ailments and requiring a license to practice medicine); N.Y. EDUC.
LAW § 6520 et seq. (McKinney 2001) (describing requirements for becoming a
licensedphysician).
2 9 E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2054 (West 2003) (requiring that a person
who is not a physician to not hold himself or herself as one); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 60/3.5 (West 2002) (defining the practice of medicine to include holding
oneself able to practice as a physicians).280 E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2055 (West 1990) (limiting use of initials
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Some require payment before one can be found to be practicing
medicine.2 8' Importantly, however, they all address the actual activity
of medical practice as well. In different terms they include diagnosis,
treatment, prescription, healing, and surgery for human illnesses and
injuries as the activities of medical practice.282 No medical practice
act mentions providing ethical or legal analysis or advice, much less
advice about how to maximize one's insurance benefits, structure
one's finances, etc. Even doctors who have had a course or two in
medical ethics, medical law, health care financing, or whatever should
be understood to be exceeding the scope of their professional practice
when they discuss such matters with their patients. A course in
medical law no more qualifies a doctor to give legal advice than a
course in forensic medicine turns a lawyer into a pathologist.
Doctors should be discouraged from acting beyond the scope of
their professional expertise. A doctor may (and should) make
decisions about his or her own conduct based on a refined and
informed sense of ethics and law. A doctor should not impose those
views on patients or act as if they are part of the doctor's professional
armamentarium.
For example, suppose a 60-year-old woman seeks fertility
services from a gynecologist who provides such services. It would be
perfectly appropriate for the gynecologist to decide that she will not
provide the services because she thinks it is unethical to render
otherwise infertile women in their 60's pregnant. Two things would
not be appropriate. First it would be wrong for the gynecologist to
reach this conclusion out of prejudice or based on a knee-jerk
reaction. A conscientious ethical position must be thought through
and tested against opposing opinions. However, assuming that we are
discussing ethics, rather than bias, no one would contend that
professionals may not act on the basis of their sincere ethical
commitments. Second, it would be inappropriate for the gynecologist
to attempt to dissuade the patient from seeking fertility services unless
"M.D." to persons with a physician's or surgeons certificate); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 60/28 (West 2002) (defining the practice of medicine to include the use of the
titles "Doctor of Medicine" or "M.D."); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6522 (McKinney 2001)
(noting use of title of "physician").
281 E.g., 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/9(D) (West 2002) (requiring a person
to pay a licensing fee before he or she can practice medicine); N.Y. EDUC. LAW §
6524(8) (McKinney 2001) (noting fees required to practice as a physician).
282 E.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6521 (McKinney 2001) (listing the activities of a
physician); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2051 (West 1990) (including prescription of
drugs and surgeries to treat human conditions). See also, e.g., 225 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 60/50(D) (West 2002) (defining the practice of medicine to include the
treatment of diagnosis of any physical or mental ailments or conditions).
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the advice is based on medical reasons. The gynecologist should
explain the risks to both mother and child of late pregnancy and
motherhood. She should alert the patient to relevant findings in the
medical literature about the adverse impact, if any, on children of
having their mother be ill or die during the child's childhood. She
should even advise the patient about whether it is a good idea, given
the patient's medical situation and all that is known about late,
assisted pregnancy, to seek the services. She should not tell the
patient whether she thinks it is ethically or socially desirable for her to
attempt to become pregnant with medical assistance. Once the doctor
has decided whether to refuse services for medical reasons, she has
made her own ethical decision. Her ethical views are no part of what
society has licensed her to transmit to the patient. In a social setting,
of course, a doctor is as free to state and argue her views as anybody
else. However, it is inappropriate to try to pass the views off as part
of her professional expertise.
Perhaps a more legally relevant example would involve a doctor
trying to outfox an insurance company. Suppose a person at risk for
Huntington's Disease seeks presymptomatic diagnosis. It is
inappropriate for a physician to tell the patient that he may have
trouble getting health insurance if his test is positive so that he should
either eschew testing or buy insurance first. This perfectly
understandable preference for a patient over an insurance company is
an effort to "game the system," in essence to practice a form of fraud
on the insurance company. It ignores the fact that causing the
company to insure a person it would have preferred not to insure has
an effect on real people, not just the bloodless company. The
hypothesized practice will increase other people's health insurance
costs, and at the margin will prevent some people from being able to
afford insurance. It represents the doctor's effort to make social
policy in the office, something the doctor has neither the expertise nor
the moral sanction to do.
As a practical matter, preventing the inappropriate imposition of
physicians' ethical, legal, political, and financial views is unlikely to
become a major task for the law. As medical practice becomes ever
more impersonal, the opportunities even for desirable doctor-patient
conversation become all too infrequent. The likelihood that many
doctors in a capitated world will be eager to spend time advising their
patients about nonmedical matters seems small. To the extent that a
problem exists, it can be attacked first through medical education as
doctors are taught to distinguish professional from nonprofessional
expertise.
Residual problems can be dealt with in two ways by the law.
First, if a doctor's behavior intrudes on the domain of another licensed
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profession, the doctor can be prosecuted for practicing that profession
without a license.283 The clearest case is the one in which a doctor
gives a patient legal advice. The use of the criminal sanction is
draconian, and it is hard to imagine that there will be many occasions
for this approach, especially once law-averse physicians have been
informed of the risk.
A more realistic response to nonprofessional behavior by doctors
is to recognize that acting beyond the scope of one's expertise is
negligent and should subject the negligent actor to damages for any
injury the negligent behavior caused. Thus, as I have suggested
before, if a doctor advises a patient to try to avoid insurance company
rules, and the insurance company discovers the ruse and denies
coverage to the patient, the physician should be liable to the patient
for the damage caused.284 These situations too will arise infrequently.
Education plus the threat of liability in an area where most doctors are
already loath to tread should suffice to keep litigation low.
Excessive concern with autonomy and with the exclusive doctor-
patient relationship are much more likely to do harm than is doctor
overreaching into areas beyond their professional expertise. Some use
of unauthorized practice statutes and tort liability should be enough to
keep physicians within the bounds of professionalism. Striving to
make them act in the full interests of patients and all significantly
affected individuals is the more important and the more difficult task.
283 See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6125-27 (West 1990) (limiting the
practice of law to only those who are active members of the State Bar); 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/1 (West 2001); N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW §§ 476a-c (McKinney
2001) (prohibiting the practice of law by unlicensed individuals); TEX. GOV'T CODE
ANN. §81.101 et seq. (Vernon 2001) (stating that it is illegal to conduct the
unauthorized practice of law).
284 The Human Genome Project, supra note 5, at 135.
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